Wednesday, 12 February 2014

Demystifying the Root and Branch Review




Introduction

With the announcement of the composition of the Review Panel for the Root and Branch Review of Competition Laws imminent, it is an opportune time to reflect on the role the Review Panel is required to undertake. Indeed, based on the draft terms of reference[1] released by the Minister for Small Business, Mr Bruce Billson, the Review Panel will have an enormous task.

However, it is not the size of the task which is the main concern. Rather the main concern is whether the Review Panel will be able to identify any substantive changes to the law which will actually have the effect of improving Australia’s competition laws. While it is relatively easy to identify the main changes to Australian competition law which the Review Panel will be focusing on, it is much more difficult to determine how those changes will work in practice.

In this post, I will outline the terms of reference for the Review Panel and discuss some of the areas where the Review Panel will be focusing it efforts. I will also identify one significant omission from the scope of the review, namely Australia’s country of origin laws. This is an area which should be included in the terms of reference if the Review Panel is to meet its goals of “achieving long term competitiveness” and “increasing productivity” of the Australian economy.

Background


The terms of reference commence with the statement that there has not been a thorough review of competition policy in Australia since the Hilmer Review in 1993. This is a puzzling statement given that in 2001 the then Coalition Government commissioned the Dawson Review, whose mandate was to conduct “an independent review of the competition provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974 and their administration.”

The terms of reference then state that given significant changes in the Australian economy it is “timely to examine whether these earlier reforms continue to be “fit for purpose” for the current and emerging economy”. This statement seems to suggest that one task to be performed by the Review Panel is to assess whether any of the earlier reforms introduced by Hilmer should be reversed or modified.

While this statement may appear at first glance to be quite controversial (particularly in the light of the reverence which tends to be accorded to the Hilmer reforms) it is not surprising that this government appears willing to put the whole Hilmer reform process on the table. There have been signs that this government believes that the Hilmer review may not have achieved the right balance between the interests of big and small business.

One particular area of the Hilmer reform process which is likely to come under close scrutiny is the repeal section 49 of the then Trade Practices Act 1974 which prohibited price discrimination. This issue will be discussed in more detail below.

The terms of reference go on to state that effective reforms of competition laws should be able to achieve long-term competitiveness, promote investment, increase productivity, support high real wage growth and increase Australian living standards. Obviously the government has very high expectations of the root and branch review.

Scope of the review


Paragraph 1


The terms of reference outline the scope of the review in paragraph 1 which states:

1. The Review Panel is to inquire into and make recommendations on appropriate reforms to improve the Australian economy and the welfare of Australians, not limited to the legislation governing Australia’s competition policy, in regard to achieving competitive and productive markets throughout the economy, by identifying and removing impediments to competition that are not in the long-term interest of consumers or the public interest, having regard to the following principles:

1.1. no participant in the market should be able to engage in anti-competitive conduct within that market and its broader value chain;

1.2. productivity boosting microeconomic reform should be identified, centred on the realisation of fair, transparent and open competition that drives productivity, stronger real wage growth and higher standards of living;

1.3. government should not be a substitute for the private sector where markets are, or can, function effectively or where contestability can be realised; and
1.4. the need to be mindful of removing wherever possible, the regulatory burden on business when assessing the costs and benefits of competition regulation.
As is clear from the introductory sentence above, the Review Panel is not limited to recommending changes to Australian competition laws. Rather, the Review Panel has been asked to inquire into, and make recommendations about ways of improving the Australian economy and welfare of Australians generally. This is a very wide mandate which significantly extends the range of issues which the Review Panel will have to consider.

Paragraph 1.1 states that the Review Panel is to identify and remove anticompetitive conduct by participants in markets, while paragraph 1.3 states that government should not be a substitute for the private sector. These two principles suggest that a major role of the Review Panel will be to look closely at the various government business entities at the Federal, State and Local levels and make recommendations about whether governments should be exiting those businesses.

This may result in the Review Panel recommending that the government privatize various government businesses in addition to Medibank, such as Australia Post, Australian Government Solicitor, AirServices Australia and Defence Housing Australia.

Paragraph 1.4 refers to the need to remove regulatory burdens on business. The most obvious target of the Review Panel’s work in this regard is likely to be local planning laws which many believe have been stifling retail competition, particularly in the grocery sector.

Paragraph 2

Paragraph 2 of the terms of reference states:

2. The Review Panel should also consider and make recommendations where appropriate, aimed at ensuring Australia’s competition regulation, policy, and regulatory agencies are effective in protecting and facilitating competition, provide incentives for innovation and creativity in business, and meet world’s best practice.
While it is obvious that the entire purpose of competition law is to protect and facilitate competition, the more interesting question is what model of competition the Review Panel will use as its starting point.

I believe that the Review Panel will be under considerable pressure to adopt a “small business model” of competition, given that the current government appears to strongly support that particular model of competition. As stated by the Minister for Small Business in a speech to the Australian Food and Grocery Council in October 2013[2]:

The Government's 'root and branch' review of Australia's competition laws and policy presents a great opportunity for identifying areas where reforms could deliver more competitive markets and drive productivity in a win for business of all sizes and for consumers. 
The review will be an independent examination of how the competition framework is working, whether it is keeping up with emerging trends, and looking beyond the competition framework to identify impediments to competition with the goal of improving the living standards of all Australians.
In a nutshell, the review provides an opportunity to support the growth and prosperity of big and small businesses while ensuring consumers are getting value for money.
We want and aspire to have competition based on merit not on muscle.
The implications of the Minister’s statement above are two fold. First, he makes it clear that competition policy should be delivering benefits for businesses of all sizes – ie both big and small businesses. Second, he makes the fairly pointed remark that competition should be based on “merit rather than muscle”.

It is apparent that the current government sees small business as an important means of driving growth in our economy, particularly employment growth. The government also appears to have deep-seated concerns about the power (or muscle) of large businesses in a range of sectors, particularly Coles and Woolworths in the grocery sector.

It is hard to see the Review Panel not being influenced in its approach to conducting this review by the ideological position of the current government in relation to small business.

Paragraph 3


Paragraph 3 of the terms of reference contains a significant amount of detail. Accordingly, in the following I will be breaking the content into a number of smaller sections:

3. The Review Panel should also consider whether the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA) and regulatory agencies are operating effectively, having regard to the regulatory balance between the Commonwealth and the States and Territories, increasing globalisation, changing market and social structures, technological change, and the need to minimise business compliance costs, including:
Under paragraph 3, the Review Panel has to consider not only whether competition laws are operating effectively, but also whether the regulator, the ACCC, is operating effectively. This is an interesting inclusion as it will necessitate a close analysis of the operation of the ACCC and the enforcement outcomes which it is achieving.

This may result in the Review Panel investigating the reasons why the ACCC has lost a number of significant cases over the last couple of years including:

  • the Metcash merger case;
  • the ANZ price fixing; and
  • Google Adwords cases. 
I suspect that a close review of the ACCC’s operations is likely to identify a range of problems in the way it runs major litigation.

Other problem areas will include the inadequate training provided to its staff in terms of conducting investigations, particularly criminal investigations. This is somewhat ironic given that the ACCC is very active in sending its senior officers overseas to train competition agency staff in developing countries about how to conduct investigations, while at the same time providing little or no investigation training to its own investigatory staff.

Paragraph 3.1


This paragraphs states that the Review Panel is to “consider whether Australia’s highly codified competition law is responsive, effective and certain in its support of its economic policy objectives.”


This term of reference appears to be a response to comments made by some commentators about the complexity of Australian competition laws, compared with other jurisdictions, most notably US antitrust laws. In the US, the legislature took the view that it was preferable to create a range of general antitrust prohibitions, and then give the courts a wide discretion to interpret those laws.

Unfortunately, the dangers of taking a less codified approach to competition laws is all too apparent from even a cursory review of US Supreme Court cases in the antitrust field over the last few years. These cases show how a conservative Supreme court has been able to adopt interpretations of antitrust laws which effectively strip those laws of most of their substantive content and intellectual coherence.

I think that it is quite unlikely that the Review Panel will recommend a move away from the codification of competition laws, and towards a more US-style of competition/antitrust laws.

Paragraph 3.2

This paragraphs states that the Review Panel has a role in:
3.2. examining whether the operations and processes of regulatory agencies are transparent, efficient, subject to appropriate external scrutiny and provide reasonable regulatory certainty…
This term of reference places the ACCC’s processes directly in the firing line. I think it is inevitable that the Review Panel will find serious shortcomings in the ACCC’s operations and processes in terms of their transparency and efficiency.

As discussed in other posts on this blog, the ACCC’s operations and processes lack transparency particularly in relation to its enforcement activities.

For example, it is all but impossible for complainants to find out whether their complaint is actually being investigated by the ACCC, as it is now the ACCC’s standard practice not to provide substantive written responses to any complaints.

Furthermore, the ACCC shows a general reluctance to provide even the companies it has under investigation with basic information about the course of its investigation or how it has interpreted the relevant law. 

Another area where the ACCC lacks transparency is in responding to complaints from business about the ACCC’s own shortcomings. The tendency of the ACCC to sweep complaints about its own conduct under the carpet is quite ironic given that the ACCC is a strong advocate of the importance of businesses implementing comprehensive and responsive complaints handling systems. One would have hoped that the ACCC would practice what it preaches, and implement a proper system for receiving, assessing and responding to complaints from business about its own performance.

I think that it is inevitable that the Review Panel will end up reconsidering two of the recommendations made by the Dawson Committee in relation to ACCC accountability, namely:

  • to establish a Joint Parliamentary Committee to oversee the ACCC’s administration of the TPA (CCA) (Recommendation 11.1); and
  • to appoint an Associate Commissioner to the ACCC to receive and respond to individual complaints about the administration of the Act and to report each year in the ACCC's annual report (Recommendation 11.3).

I think both of these steps would have positive impacts on the ACCC’s administration of the Act. A specific Joint Parliamentary Committee to oversee the ACCC’s administration of the Act would introduce some proper accountability, particularly in relation to the ACCC’s financial management.

The appointment of an Associate Commissioner to receive and respond to individual complaints about the administration of the Act and to report each year in the ACCC's annual report, would give businesses with concerns about their treatment at the hands of the ACCC some place to turn.

At the moment complaints about the ACCC’s administration are simply referred back to the relevant ACCC officer to prepare a response. This is not an appropriate way to respond to complaints. There needs to be a system to refer complaints to a more senior person, who is relatively independent, and who has a statutory obligation to investigate and provide a proper response to complaints.

Paragraph 3.3

Paragraph 3.3 states that the Review Panel must report on the following issues:

3.3. ensuring that the CCA appropriately protects the competitive process and facilitates competition, including by (but not limited to):
3.3.1. examining whether current legislative provisions are functioning as intended in light of actual experience and precedent;

3.3.2. considering whether the misuse of market power provisions effectively prohibit anti-competitive conduct and are sufficient to: address the breadth of matters expected of them; capture all behaviours of concern; and support the growth of efficient businesses regardless of their size;

3.3.3. considering whether areas that are currently uncertain or rarely used in Australian law could be framed and administered more effectively;

3.3.4. considering whether the framework for industry codes of conduct (with reference to State and Territory codes where relevant) and protections against unfair and unconscionable conduct, provide an adequate mechanism to encourage reasonable business dealings across the economy - particularly in relation to small business;

3.3.5. whether existing exemptions from competition law and/or historic sector-specific arrangements (e.g. conditional offers between related businesses and immunities for providers of liner shipping services) are still warranted; and

3.3.6. considering whether the National Access Regime contained in Part IIIA of the CCA (taking into account the Productivity Commission’s recent inquiry) is adequate…
It is clear from the above that an area of particular concern for the government is whether the misuse of market power provisions of the CCA are operating effectively. There appears to be a view amongst members of the government that small businesses are being subjected to unfair and bullying conduct by larger companies, particularly the two major grocers, and that section 46 should be able to be used to prevent such conduct.

However, what is not clear is how section 46 can be used either in its current form or in a modified form to provide better protection for small business.

One of the main problems facing small business at the retail level is that they struggle to purchase products at the wholesale level as cheaply as much larger competitors, such as Coles and Woolworths.

Many small business advocates believe that the reintroduction of price discrimination provisions to Australian competition laws would provide a positive benefit to small businesses. Their reasoning is that such laws would prevent larger businesses from buying goods from suppliers at significantly lower prices than competing small businesses can acquire the same goods. The clearest example of this is the buying power of the two large retailers, Coles and Woolworths, compared with the buying power of small independent grocers.

Unfortunately, the view that the reintroduction of price discrimination laws will somehow level the playing field between large and small business is misplaced. The reintroduction of such laws will simply result in higher wholesale prices across the industry, to the financial benefit of suppliers. The final consumer will again be the biggest loser when retail prices are pushed upwards.

Having said that, I think there is a strong possibility that the Review Panel may ultimately recommend the reintroduction of a prohibition on price discrimination.

Another significant area in terms of section 46 is whether to introduce an effects test. There has been a great deal of criticism of the requirement in section 46 that the ACCC must establish that a firm with a substantial degree of market power also had a prohibited purpose. Critics claim that a competition statute should focus on the effects of conduct and not the purpose of the firm in engaging in that conduct. The ACCC is also critical of the purpose test because it claims it is difficult to establish.

There are strong arguments to change section 46 to introduce an effects test. Effects tests are clearly the dominant legal test in most other leading jurisdictions, such as the US and European Community, in their monopolisation statutes. In addition, it makes more sense to try to prohibit conduct which has had a demonstrable effect on competition, rather than punish conduct which, while aimed at lessening competition, may prove to be ultimately unsuccessful in achieving that outcome.

It is also not correct to state that the ACCC has had difficulty establishing the purpose element in the section 46 cases. In fact, the ACCC has never failed to establish the purpose element in any section 46 case which it has run. Rather the ACCC has failed to establish either taking advantage element or that the relevant firm possessed a substantial degree of market power in the relatively few section 46 cases it has lost.

I think it is highly likely that the Review Panel will recommend the introduction of an effects test under section 46. On the other hand, the Review Panel is unlikely to recommend the removal of the existing purpose test. Rather I think the Review Panel will recommend that section 46 be amended to add an effects test to the existing purpose test. This will make section 46 consistent with sections 45 and 47 which both have a purpose and/or effect tests.

No doubt, the Review Panel will be strongly encouraged by various groups, particularly small business lobby groups, to support the introduction of a Groceries Code along the lines of the UK Groceries Supply Code of Practice. The purpose of the UK Code is to promote fair dealing between major grocery companies and smaller business suppliers by redressing imbalances in bargaining power.

The purpose of the UK Code is explained under Principle 2 which states:

A Retailer must at all times deal with its Suppliers fairly and lawfully. Fair and lawful dealing will be understood as requiring the Retailer to conduct its trading relationships with Suppliers in good faith, without distinction between formal or informal arrangements, without duress and in recognition of the Suppliers’ need for certainty as regards the risks and costs of trading, particularly in relation to production, delivery and payment issues.
It is almost inevitable that the Review Panel will recommend the introduction of a Groceries Code in Australia.

Paragraph 3.3.3 states that the Review Panel is to consider whether there are any areas that are currently uncertain or rarely used in Australian law which could be framed and administered more effectively.

Unfortunately, there many areas of law in the competition area which could be classified as uncertain, including the misuse of market power prohibition, the operation of the criminal cartel provisions and even what constitutes an understanding for the purposes of section 45.

It will be a significant task for the Review Panel to explore these various areas of uncertainty and to come to sensible recommendations for improvement.

However, of more interest will be the Review Panel’s consideration of areas of law which:

  • have not been enforced at all, such as criminal cartels, the Birdsville amendment and price signalling laws; or 
  • enforced only intermittently such as secondary boycott laws and misuse of market power provisions. 
The reality about section 46 is that the ACCC takes very few cases. Since the introduction of the provision in 1974, the ACCC has only commenced 20 cases.[3] In other words, the ACCC has only taken 20 section 46 cases in 40 years or one case every two years.

Furthermore, the ACCC will be very uncomfortable having to explain to the Review Panel why it has not taken a secondary boycott case against any union for the last nine years.

Paragraph 3.4


Paragraphs states that the Review Panel is to examine:

3.4. whether competition regulations, enforcement arrangements and appeal mechanisms are in line with international best practice and:

3.4.1. foster a productive and cost-minimising interface between the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) and industry (for instance, through applications for immunity or merger clearances) that is simple, effective and well designed;

3.4.2. provide appropriate mechanisms for enforcement and seeking redress including;


· whether administration and enforcement of competition laws is being carried out in an effective, transparent and consistent way; 
· whether enforcement and redress mechanisms can be effectively used by people to enforce their rights - by small businesses in particular; and
· the extent to which new enforcement powers, remedies or enhanced penalties might be necessary and appropriate to prohibit anti-competitive conduct, and

3.4.3. can adequately address competition issues in emerging markets and across new technologies, particularly e-commerce environments, to promote entrepreneurship and innovation.
These paragraphs tend to repeat a number of the same issues identified earlier in the terms of reference. For example, there is a further reference to whether the administration and enforcement of competition laws is being carried out by the ACCC in an effective, transparent and consistent way.

The reference to the Review Panel exploring the need for new enforcement powers, remedies or enhanced penalties is likely to raise the issue of whether to introduce a divestiture remedy. In other words, whether courts should be given the power to order that a firm, which has been found to have breached competition laws, be required to divest particular assets to reduce their market power.

In the United States, divestiture has long been recognised as one of the remedies which can be sought in relation to monopolisation cases under antitrust laws. The power of US courts to order divestiture in monopolization cases does not arise from a specific statutory provision but rather from the court’s equitable jurisdiction.

Whilst this remedy has only been sought on rare occasions in the US, there are two notable examples.

The first divestiture in US antitrust history in relation to a monopolisation case occurred in 1911 when the US Supreme Court ordered the dissolution of the Standard Oil Trust into 34 separate companies after the company had gained almost monopoly power in the US fuel industry.[4]

The other significant divestiture case occurred in 1982 when AT&T consented to being broken up into seven regional service companies or “Baby bells” after becoming a virtual monopoly in the provision of telephony services.[5]

These cases show that a divestiture remedy is both feasible and appropriate in situations where a company has amassed a substantial degree of market power and has used that market power to damage competition.

I think it is possible that the Review Panel will recommend the introduction of a divestiture remedy in relation to proven breaches of section 46 of the CCA.

Paragraph 4

Paragraph 4 states the following:
4. The Review Panel should inquire into and advise on appropriate changes to legislation, institutional arrangements and other measures in relation to the matters below, having regard to the impact on long-term consumer benefits in relation to value, innovation, choice and access to goods and services, and the capacity of Australian business to compete both domestically and internationally. In particular, the Review Panel should:

4.1. examine the structure and behaviour of markets with natural monopoly characteristics with a view to determining whether the existing regulatory frameworks are leading to efficient outcomes and whether there are opportunities to increase competition;

4.2. examine whether key markets - including, but not limited to, groceries, utilities and automotive fuel - are competitive and whether changes to the scope of the CCA and related laws are necessary to enhance consumer, producer, supplier and retailer opportunities in those markets and their broader value chains;

4.3. consider alternative means for addressing anti-competitive market structure, composition and behaviour currently outside the scope of the CCA;

4.4. consider the impact of concentration and vertical integration in key Australian markets on the welfare of Australians ensuring that any changes to the coverage and nature of competition policy is consistent with national economic policy objectives; and

4.5. identify opportunities for removing unnecessary and inefficient barriers to entry and competition, reducing complexity and eliminating administrative duplication.

4.6. consider ways to ensure Australians can access goods and services at internationally competitive prices, including examining any remaining parallel import restrictions and international price discrimination.
This term of reference empowers the Review Panel to consider the effectiveness of the access regime established under Part IIA. It is somewhat surprising that this has been included in the terms of reference, given that the Productivity Commission has only recently conducted an extensive review of Part IIIA and concluded that the access regime is working effectively and should be retained.

Having said that, the government’s response to the recent release of the Productivity Commission Report has been equivocal, to say the least. As stated by the Minister:[6]

The Government will respond to the Productivity Commission’s report following the outcomes of the root and branch review.

Therefore, it seems that the government will be placing a great deal more weight on any conclusions reached by the root and brand Review Panel about the future of Part IIIA, than on the findings reached by the Productivity Commission.

This term of reference is also notable to the extent that it singles out three industries for specific attention - namely, groceries, utilities and automotive fuel. While it is not surprising that the government has decided to single out these three industries, it is very difficult to speculate about the type of changes which the Review Panel may end up recommending, with the exception of the grocery industry, which is likely to see the introduction of Groceries Code.

This term of reference also identifies two specific practices which the Review Panel must examine – ie parallel import restrictions and international price discrimination. The inclusion of these issues in the terms of reference will greatly increase the Review Panel's work in terms of both volume and complexity.

Paragraph 5

Paragraph 5 states that:

5. The Review Panel should also examine whether government business activities and services providers serve the public interest and promote competition and productivity, including consideration of separating government funding of services from service provision, privatisation, corporatisation, price regulation that improves price signals in non-competitive segments, and competitive neutrality policy.
Again, this term of reference appears to duplicate a number of the earlier terms of reference.

Paragraph 6

Finally paragraph 6 states:

6. The Review Panel should consider and make recommendations on the most appropriate ways to enhance competition, by removing regulation and by working with stakeholders to put in place economic devices that ensure a fair balance between regulatory expectations of the community and self-regulation, free markets and the promotion of competition.
This appears to be a catchall provision.

Further directions

At the end of the terms of reference is some further guidance for the Review Panel on how they are to approach their task.

The Review Panel should consider overseas experience insofar as it may be useful for the review.

The Review Panel may, where appropriate, draw on (but should not duplicate or re-visit) the work of other recent or current comprehensive reviews, such as the Commission of Audit and the Cost-Benefit Analysis and Regulatory Review for the National Broadband Network.

The Review Panel should only consider the Australian Consumer Law (Schedule 2 of the CCA) and corresponding provisions in Part 2, Division 2 of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001, to the extent they relate to protections (such as from unfair and unconscionable conduct) for small businesses.
These paragraphs make it clear that the Review Panel:
  • is permitted to consider overseas experience
  • is not to duplicate work which has already been assigned to the Commission of Audit and the Cost-Benefit Analysis and Regulatory Review for the National Broadband Network. 
However, the paragraph of most significance is the prohibition on the Review Panel considering any provisions of the Australian Consumer Law except for the unfair contract terms and unconscionable conduct provisions.

While it is appropriate for the Review Panel to consider these areas, given their relevance to small business, it seems somewhat shortsighted not to have included Australian’s country of origin laws as part of the review.

Country of origin laws are in desperate need of review, due to the uncertainty which surrounds the application of these laws. What should also be remembered is that these laws are potentially a major driver of economic growth, particular export growth, for Australian businesses.

Many small businesses wish to manufacture in Australia and export their goods as Australian Made. However, they fear engaging in such activities for the risk of falling foul of the ACCC’s and the Australian Made Campaign’s interpretation of relevant laws. Unfortunately, both the ACCC and the Australian Made Campaign have adopted highly questionable interpretations of the relevant legal tests contained in Part 5-3 of the Australian Consumer Law, which have stymied small business activity. These interpretations (which in appear in various official publications) have had the effect of preventing many Australian businesses from being able to claim that their products are Australian Made and, in some cases, have resulted in Australian manufacturers losing lucrative export contracts.

I recall one case where a client was able to legitimately claim that over 95% of his production costs were attributable to processes in Australia. Unfortunately, both the ACCC and Australian Made Campaign formed the view that despite virtually all of this client’s costs of manufacture being incurred in Australia, he did not satisfy the substantial transformation test. As a result, this small business was unable to continue marketing his products as Australian Made in various export markets, including to customers in China.

In this case, the Australian Made Campaign expressed the view that footwear can only be classified as the Australian Made, if the materials for the footwear were “cut and sewn” in Australia. When queried about this issue, the Australian Made Campaign advised that their view was based an ACCC publication which made this statement. I fail to see how the mere act of cutting leather into particular shapes is a necessary step in demonstrating that a good has been substantially transformed in Australia.

While much of the recent media focus has been on the closure of large scale manufacturing operations, such as the car manufacturers and canning operations, the business group which has been largely forgotten by government are small Australian manufacturing businesses. The reality is that these small manufacturing businesses would be able to generate much greater levels of sales, including greater export sales, if there was a more flexible country of origin test.

The solution to the problem of our restrictive country of origin laws is quite simple - we should raise the cost of production threshold to 60% of the cost of manufacture, while at the same time completely removing the substantial transformation test. If an Australian business can prove that 60% of the cost of manufacturing its goods is attributable to Australia, it should be able to claim that these goods are Made in Australia. Businesses should not also have to prove that these goods have been substantially transformed in Australia.

Not only is the substantial transformation test a very vague standard, which is almost impossible to define, but both the ACCC and the Australian Made Campaign have demonstrated that they all but incapable of properly interpreting this standard in real world situations.

If the government truly wishes the root and branch review to achieve such lofty goals as achieving competitive and productive markets and the removal of impediments to competition that are not in the long-term interest of consumers or the public interest, it should amend the terms of reference to include a thorough review of Australia’s country of origin laws. A number of small but significant changes to our country of origin laws will provide a major boost to Australian small business manufacturing, which in turn could open up many new export opportunities.

While governments often tend to focus on large reforms which they see as having the potential to transform the entire economy, such as the introduction of an access regime or the privatization of large government owned businesses, it is often the smaller market reforms which end up creating more far-reaching and long-lasting benefits to the Australian economy. If this government is serious about trying to unlock the full potential of small business manufacturing in Australia, it should ask the Review Panel to review the operation of Australia’s country of origin laws. Hopefully such a review would result in country of origin laws which are supportive, rather than obstructive, of small business entrepreneurship in Australia.




[1] http://www.apha.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Terms-of-reference.pdf
[4] ( Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) - http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/221/1/case.html)
[5] (United States v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 - Dist. Court, Dist. of Columbia 1982 - http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12093892347857939076&q=552+F.+Supp.+131&hl=en&as_sdt=2002) 
[6] Productivity Commission’s final report on National Access Regime released, 11 February 2014 – at http://bfb.ministers.treasury.gov.au/media-release/003-2014/

Tuesday, 3 December 2013

Running on Empty: Why is the ACCC running out of money?




Introduction

At a recent Senate estimates hearing before the Economics Legislation Committee, Rod Sims, the current chair of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) admitted that the organisation had run up significant operational losses over the last three years.[1] The earlier realisation that the ACCC was operating well beyond its means prompted the Coalition government to claim that the previous Labor government had allowed the ACCC to “run down” by providing it with inadequate funding.[2] The Business Council of Australia also weighed into the debate, claiming that the ACCC had increased its staffing levels significantly over the last decade at a rate which outstripped the rate of employment growth across the broader economy.[3]

Given the divergent views, it is somewhat difficult to work out where the truth lies in relation to the ACCC's funding. Either the ACCC has been failing to manage its finances responsibly or its activities have been significantly underfunded for some time, which has in turn undermined its ability to enforce its legislation. As with most issues, neither position is entirely correct. The reality is that whilst the ACCC does not receive sufficient funding to properly carry out its legislative responsibilities, it has also been operating in an inefficient manner which has seen it achieving suboptimal outcomes.

In this blog post, I will identify the main areas of over-expenditure within the ACCC and identify where inefficiencies exist. I will then make some proposals which may assist the ACCC in improving its financial performance in the future.

Background

The total amounts by which the ACCC has overspent its budget over the last three financial years is quite remarkable. As outlined in its most recent Annual Report for the 2012 – 2013 financial year,[4] the ACCC has generated the following losses over the last three years:

  • 2012-2013 $25.9 million
  • 2011-2012 $26 million
  • 2010-2011 $9.3 million

These losses should be seen in the context of the ACCC's total funding, as follows:
  • 2012-2013 $150 million
  • 2011-2012 $151 million
  • 2010-2011 $141 million
Therefore, the amount by which the ACCC has overspent its budget over the last three financial years has increased from 6.5% of its total budget in 2010-2011 to approximately 17% of its total budget in the following two financial years.

In other words, over the last two years the ACCC has spent almost 20% more than the amount that it received from the Commonwealth Government to run its operations.

Justifications

The ACCC provided the following explanation to the recent Economics Legislation Committee as to why it had overspent its budget by such large amounts over the last three years:

(The overspend was) largely a function of the fact that we have been asked to do more. The economy is growing, so we get more mergers and we get more activity on all our fronts. We are the competition regulator, the consumer regulator, the safety regulator, we do a lot of compliance work, we deal with mergers, authorizations…
One of the problems for us has been that we are about 60 per cent staffing and about 15 per cent legal funding. All the various across-the-board cuts that have occurred through the public sector, particularly in the efficiency dividends, have really eroded our funding base quite a lot. There is very little room to move. When you are 60 per cent staffing and then you have legal expenses and property expenses, there are very few expenses you can actually do something with.[5]
In other words, the main reason for the funding shortfall was because the ACCC has been given more functions than it had three years ago. The efficiency dividend required by the former Labor government also had a negative impact on the ACCC’s funding position.

The ACCC reiterated this view when responding to comments by the Business Council of Australia (BCA) about the ACCC’s staffing levels. In the BCA report entitled “Improving Australia's Regulatory System”, it stated that the ACCC’s staffing levels had increased from 540 staff in the 2001-2002 financial year to 876 in the 2011-2012 year. The BCA commented that the ACCC’s staffing levels had “outstripped the rate of employment growth across the broader economy during the same period.”

The ACCC’s response to the BCA was swift. The ACCC immediately issued a media release to defend its position:

The Business Council of Australia has today issued a report showing that the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission’s staffing has increased from 540 in 2001-2 to 876 in 2011–12, or 4.95% per annum (the current number of working full time equivalent staff is actually just over 800). It seeks to make a point about the growth in regulatory spending and staff numbers.
The ACCC’s growth over this period is associated with completely new functions and responsibilities, most assumed from state regulators and other bodies. Without these additional functions, the ACCC’s base line growth since 2001-2 has been 1.8% per annum.
The ACCC’s new functions and responsibilities in the past ten years include:

  • The establishment of the Australian Energy Regulator (2005) following CoAG agreement to create a national energy market regulator has seen the transition of gas and electricity regulatory and enforcement functions from state regulators to the AER over the past 8 years.
  • In 2007, the ACCC became responsible for the development, monitoring and enforcement of water market and charge rules in the Murray Darling Basin.
  • Under the Wheat Export Marketing Act 2008, the ACCC is responsible for monitoring compliance of port operators for bulk export wheat.
  • Following the completion of its Fuel inquiry in 2007, the ACCC was directed by the government to undertake monitoring of the prices, costs and profits of unleaded petrol in Australia.
  • The ACCC assumed responsibility for the regulation of the Hunter Valley rail line from IPART in 2011.
  • In 2009, the ACCC became Australia’s national product safety regulator.
While the underlying staff growth of 1.8% per annum is below real GDP growth, this staffing increase has had to accommodate increased roles in our core areas, such as the regulation of the NBN, the introduction of the Australian Consumer Law, the criminalisation of cartel conduct and carbon price claims, to name a few.

Indeed, in the ACCC’s core responsibilities, such as in enforcing competition law, the ACCC’s staffing has likely not increased at all since 2001-2 despite the greater size and complexity of the Australian economy.
While vigorous in its defence, the ACCC’s news release it entirely disingenuous. The ACCC’s response claims that it has acquired a wide range of additional functions since 2001, whilst making no mention of the significant functions which it has lost since the 2001-2002 financial year, most notably its education, monitoring and enforcement role in relation to the introduction of the GST.

The introduction of the GST in 2000 resulted in the ACCC gaining an extensive economy-wide role in providing information to businesses and consumers about the operation of the new tax, as well as a role in conducting extensive price monitoring and enforcement activities. Indeed the ACCC’s role in relation to the introduction of the GST was in many respects the largest and most challenging function which the ACCC has ever been required to undertake in its history.

Therefore, it is quite inaccurate for the ACCC to claim, as it has, that it was the range of new functions which is has gained since 2001-2002 which has lead to the steep rise in staff numbers by 62% over the period. Indeed, it is arguable that the loss of the GST function means that the ACCC now has a much less demanding role than it did in 2001.

Staffing levels

ACCC staffing levels have fluctuated over the last few years. In the 2009-2010 financial year, the ACCC had 756 budgeted staff positions but only 732 actual staff numbers. In other words, the ACCC had 24 less staff on its books than the amount for which it was receiving funding.

This situation changed quite dramatically in the next financial year when the number of budgeted positions rose from 756 to 778. Unfortunately, the actual number of staff employed at the ACCC also rose over the course of that year from 732 to 790. In other words, the ACCC hired 18 more staff than to could afford to pay, based on its budgeted numbers.

In the 2011-2012, the ACCC received funding for a record 813 staff members. This level of staff funding was only slightly above its actual staff numbers of 807 staff.

The significant reduction in budgeted staff positions occurred in the 2012-2013 financial year, when the ACCC only received funding for 745 staff, a reduction of 68 staff positions from the previous year. It also seems that the ACCC was unable to reduce its actual staff numbers significantly in response to this reduction in its staffing budget. Despite receiving funding for 68 less staff members in 2012-2013, the ACCC was only able to reduce its actual staff numbers by nine positions. In other words, the ACCC operated throughout the 2012-2013 financial year with 53 unfunded staff members. Needless to say, this is very poor public administration.

Interestingly, the recent suggestion that the ACCC had not been properly funded by the former Labor Government seems questionable given the level of staff funding provided to the ACCC in the current financial year. In the 2013-2014 financial year, the ACCC has received funding for 802 staff positions which is an increase of 56 positions from the previous year, and four more positions than the ACCC’s actual staff numbers in the previous year.

Management structure


One concerning aspect about the ACCC’s current management structure is that it appears to be remarkably top heavy. In other words, there appears to be a disproportionately large number of senior managers being paid large salaries, including significant performance pay.

For example, the ACCC currently operates with one Chief Executive Officer and two Deputy Chief Executive Officers who are all at the Band 3 Senior Executive Service level. It seems somewhat strange that an organization with only 800 employees would effectively need three CEO’s to manage the organization.

Indeed, there would be very few private companies with significantly larger workforces that would need to employ three CEO’s.

Highly paid staff

Another concern relates to the number of highly paid staff within the ACCC. In the ACCC’s most recent annual report, the ACCC listed a total of 54 staff that would be considered highly paid staff.[6] Of these 54 staff, 49 staff were being paid in excess of $180,000 per year. In other words, over 5% of all ACCC staff are being paid more than $180,000 a year.

The annual report also shows that 14 staff are receiving salaries of between $210,000 to $239,000 per year, whilst a further 11 staff are receiving salaries of between $240,000 to $269,000 per year.

It is also apparent that the ACCC’s Senior Executive Service are much more expensive than the above salary figures would suggest. In the ACCC’s annual report, it records the total remuneration paid to the ACCC Senior Executive Staff in the form of salary, annual leave accrued, performance pay, other allowances, superannuation and long service leave.[7] This table shows that the ACCC’s 54 SES employees cost the ACCC a total of $17,768,883 in 2013 which equates to $329,053 per employee.

This level of remuneration for the ACCC’s Senior Executive Service appears to be quite excessive, particularly given that the ACCC is a public sector organization.

Performance pay


The ACCC annual report also records the total amount of performance pay being paid to its staff.[8] It appears that total performance pay of $1,185,026 was paid to 86 staff members in 2013. This equates to an average performance pay of approximately $13,800 per staff member.

While this is less than the amount of performance pay paid to staff in 2011-2012 financial year, which was approximately $1.3 million, one has to question whether a public sector organisation should be paying almost $1 million worth of performance pay to its employees each year.

Consultancies

Another area which has experienced significant growth over the last three years is in relation to consultancy agreements. The ACCC disclosed in its annual report that in the 2012-2013 financial year it entered into 62 new external consultancy contracts worth a total of $4.4 million. This is in addition to 17 ongoing consultancy contracts which account for a further $4 million.[9]

Therefore, in the 2012-2013 financial year, the ACCC spent a total of $8.8 million, or approximately 6% of its total budget, on external consultancies.

The amount spent by the ACCC on consultancies in the 2012-2013 financial year was 22% higher than the amount it spent on external consultancies in the previous financial year (ie $7.2 million) and 30% more than it spent in the 2010-2011 financial year (ie $6.9 million).

One has to ask why the ACCC has to enter into so many external consultancies and why it is paying so much for these consultancies. Another important question is why have external consultancies increased by 30% in dollar terms over the last three years.

This trend is even more concerning in the light of the fact that the ACCC has access to a large and highly paid, and one would assume highly skilled, Senior Executive Service. The question is why the ACCC cannot apparently meet its need for specialist technical advice from amongst the ranks of its existing Senior Executive Service.

How can the ACCC improve its bottom line?

During the ACCC’s evidence at the recent Senate Estimates hearings, it claimed to have implemented a range of strategies to reduce its costs, including by:

  • offering voluntary redundancies;
  • reducing travel costs;
  • cutting back on newspaper subscriptions; and
  • reviewing its accommodation needs. 
However, these measures only offer piecemeal solutions to the ACCC’s financial crisis.

As suggested above, a significant cost is the ACCC's Senior Executive Service. Not only does the ACCC’s Senior Executive Service appear to be disproportionately large, comprising 54 staff members, but this select group of employees is very costly, costing the ACCC approximately $329,000 per employee per year.

The ACCC must conduct an urgent and in-depth review into the size and cost of its Senior Executive Service to determine whether it needs such a large Senior Executive Service and whether some of these employees are being paid too much.

The ACCC should also conduct an urgent review of its performance pay scheme. Such a review is particularly important when one analyses the ACCC’s performance in relation to major litigation over the last three years. Whilst there have been a number of notable successes, including the airline cartel cases and the Apple iPad case, there have been a number of quite spectacular and costly losses including:
  • Metcash – Franklins merger opposition;
  • Google sponsored links case;
  • ANZ price fixing case; and
  • Cement Australia section 46 case.
Simply put the ACCC’s recent performance in major litigation cannot justify the organisation continuing to pay such generous performance pay.

It would also be sensible for the ACCC to review its practices in terms of entering into external consultancies. The ACCC is relying too heavily on external consultants to provide the types of advice which the ACCC should be able to obtain from its own Senior Executive Service.

Other sources of inefficiency


Litigation


As a practitioner who has regular interactions with the ACCC, as well as a former ACCC employee for 15 years, it is quite easy to identify areas where the ACCC is not operating efficiently.

For example, one area of inefficiency relates to the way in which the ACCC runs its litigation. The ACCC has a tendency to overstaff its litigation in relation to small and medium sized cases. While it is invariably the case that larger corporate respondents will retain large legal teams consisting of lawyers from the top tier legal firms to fight the ACCC, the same is not true of small and medium respondents. It is relation to these smaller respondents that the ACCC ends up incurring too much legal expense.

The ACCC will often retain two or even three senior lawyers from a top tier legal firm or the Australian Government Solicitor to work on even relatively small cases. For example, in a recent case, the ACCC had a legal team consisting of three senior lawyers from a top tier legal firm and a senior barrister. This was despite the respondents only being represented by a small firm solicitor and a junior barrister.

The ACCC also appears to have developed a practice of overspending on barristers when running smaller cases. Often the ACCC will retain a senior barrister, or even a senior and a junior barrister when running relatively small and simple cases against unsophisticated opposition.

I recall that when I worked at the ACCC, we would often use a sole junior barrister on smaller cases to save money, as well as to skill-up these junior barristers. For example, we decided to use only a junior barrister in the high profile Ian Turpie impotency trial (namely Robert Bromwich, now the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions). On another occasion, we decided to use a sole junior barrister to run a five-day trial in the Original Mama’s case. Both barristers rose to the challenge and did exceptionally well in each case.


The ACCC also have a habit to throwing enormous amounts of legal resources at large scale litigation in a haphazard way. This was particularly evident in a case I was involved in for a client who had agreed to give evidence as part of the ACCC's case. It was apparent to me from my interactions with the ACCC in that case that whilst it had assembled a very large legal team of experienced lawyers and barristers to run the case, there was also a total lack of organization and planning. Indeed, it seemed to me sometimes that the ACCC's legal team lacked any any clear case theory. Needless to say, the ACCC lost the case.

Companies in liquidation

Another area of concern relates to the ACCC’s tendency to continue pursuing litigation against companies which have gone into liquidation. I fail to see how a judgment or penalty against a company which no longer exists is a sensible use of the ACCC’s limited resources.

The ACCC will still have to spend a significant amount of money to secure a penalty and costs order against the company in liquidation. The only difference with these cases is that the ACCC knows beforehand that it will not recover any of the penalty or costs which may be ordered by the court.

For example each of the following cases, involved a company which had gone into liquidation:

  • Elite Publishing
  • E-Direct
  • Energy Watch 
  • Yellow Page Marketing BV/Yellow Publishing Limited
  • Global One Mobile Entertainment Ltd / 6G Pty Ltd
  • Marksun Australia Pty Ltd
  • · SMS Global
As far as I am aware, the ACCC never saw a cent of the penalties and costs awarded in these cases.

Case selection

While the ACCC’s case selection practices have improved dramatically over the last few years, there are still some notable anomalies.

For example, earlier this year the ACCC accepted an undertaking from Toyota Australia relation to representations that the upholstery in certain vehicle interiors was ‘leather’, when in fact the upholstery was only partially leather.[10]

I find it hard to understand why the ACCC pursued this matter, given that it seeks to prioritise matters based on the level of consumer detriment. If the ACCC had believed that Toyota’s conduct had created a significant degree of consumer detriment, one would have expected to see the ACCC demanding consumer remedies as part of the settlement.

However, the only remedies sought by the ACCC in relation to this matter were that Toyota: 

  • publish corrective notices;
  • implement a supplementary trade practices compliance program;
  • provide training for Toyota Australia sales and marketing staff and dealers; and 
  • implement a procedure for the review of product information materials.
In other words, there were absolutely no consumer remedies sought by the ACCC in this case.

Another odd use of resources relates to the Samsung Electronics case.[11] In this matter, Samsung provided an undertaking to the ACCC concerning alleged misrepresentations about the energy savings of its Bubble Wash washing machines compared to conventional washing machines. Despite the ACCC’s view that the company had misled its customers about these products, it did not require Samsung to offer any of its customers a refund of their purchase price. Rather, the only consumer remedy obtained by the ACCC in this case was that Samsung extend its manufacturer's warranty by three years.

I also represented a small Australian business in an ACCC investigation in relation to country of origin representations. The ACCC focused its investigation on the representations being made by my client in relation to products which it was exporting to places such as China, Korea and Europe.

Apart from the very real question of whether the ACCC even had jurisdiction in relation to this conduct, I could not see how the pursuit of this investigation was a justifiable use of the ACCC’s resources. After all, no Australian consumers were being affected by my client’s conduct.

The ACCC ultimately closed its investigation after a few months when it realized that my client was not breaching the Australian Consumer Law in relation to products it was selling to non-Australian consumers in overseas markets.

The treatment of legal costs

The indications are that the ACCC’s financial position will deteriorate further in the 2013-2014 financial year.

The ACCC will have to pay the legal costs orders made against it after losing two high profile and long running cases – namely the Google sponsored links case and the ANZ price fixing case. It is likely these two costs orders alone will be more than $5 million.

One change which the ACCC should propose to the current government relates to the way in which legal costs from litigation should be treated from an accounting perspective. As I understand current arrangements, the ACCC is required to pay any costs orders made against it out of its recurrent funding, whilst any costs orders made in the ACCC’s favour are paid into consolidated revenue, rather than into the ACCC’s accounts.

This approach to legal costs does not make any sense.

A more sensible approach would be to permit the ACCC to add any costs which it recovers in litigation to its recurrent budget. This would add significant revenues to the ACCC's overall budget, given its very high success rate in litigation.

Conclusions

The ACCC’s financial position has deteriorated significantly over the past three years, due primarily to the current Chairman’s ambitious enforcement program. Rod Sims is clearly focused on pursuing larger, more complex and ultimately more important enforcement cases that his predecessor. However, with this strategy comes obvious risks - namely that the ACCC will start losing a greater number of cases than it has in the past.

A significant impact on the ACCC’s financial position will be the legal costs it has to pay when it does end up losing large, long running cases. The ACCC has already felt the financial impact of its loss in the Metcash-Franklins case which no doubt cost the organization many millions of dollars in legal costs. It is also looking at paying further large costs orders following its losses in the Google sponsored links case and the ANZ price fixing case. Indeed, a loss in the Visa section 46 case could very well bankrupt the ACCC entirely. However, the ACCC must not be dissuaded from pursuing important enforcement cases due to the fear of losing and having to pay significant legal costs. 

Having said that the ACCC must also be honest in admitting that its organization’s structure it far too top heavy and that it’s Senior Executive Service is too expensive at $17 million a year. It should also acknowledge that it is spending too much money on external consultancies. The ACCC must take the initiative in conducting its own root and branch review of its senior management structures, its use of external consultancies and the way in which it conducts litigation. If it conducts such a review in an open and transparent manner, it will quickly realize that it can make significant reductions in its cost of doing business, which will in turn help it to get a lot more bang for its buck.






[2] ACCC to run out of Money, says Joe Hockey, Sydney Morning Herald, 7 November 2013 at http://www.smh.com.au/business/accc-to-run-out-of-money-says-joe-hockey-20131107-2x2wd.html
[3] Improving Regulation requires Sharper Focus on Regulators, Business Council of Australia, 22 November 2013 at http://www.bca.com.au/newsroom/improving-regulation-requires-sharper-focus-on-regulators
[5] Above footnote 1, 37.
[6] Above footnote 4, 279.
[7] Ibid 278.
[8] Ibid 219.
[9] Ibid 231.

[10] Toyota Australia gives an undertaking to ACCC on ‘leather’ claims, ACCC news release, 12 February 2013 at http://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/toyota-australia-gives-an-undertaking-to-accc-on-%E2%80%98leather%E2%80%99-claims

[11] Samsung Electronics Australia provides ACCC with undertaking over energy savings claims, ACCC news release, 21 January 2013 at http://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/samsung-electronics-australia-provides-accc-with-undertaking-over-energy-savings

Friday, 5 July 2013

Usual Suspects: The Credit Default Swap Investigation














This article first appeared on the CCH Law Chat website on 4 July 2013

Introduction


On 1 July 2013, the European Commission (EC) issued a statement of objections to thirteen of the world's largest investment banks concerning alleged anti-competitive conduct in relation to credit default swaps.[1] In its statement of objection the EC alleged that these investment banks may have engaged in a “serious breach” of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). While it is still very early days and details of the alleged illegal behaviour remain quite sketchy, if the EC’s investigation is successful, a number of the world's largest investment banks may be liable to pay billions of dollars worth of fines.


What are credit default swaps?


The EC’s investigation relates to a financial derivative product called a Credit Default Swap or a CDS.

A credit default swap is a form of insurance against possible default in the payment on an underlying debt. A company sells its credit risk to a buyer for a fee. In return, the buyer agrees to indemnify the seller against its losses if the borrower fails to meet its obligations under the loan.

Satyajit Das in his book, Traders, Guns and Money: Knowns and Unknows in the Dazzling World of Derivatives[2] explains why companies choose to enter into a CDS contract:


The basic idea of a CDS is simple. Assume that a bank has made a loan to a client. The bank now wants to sell the risk on the loan; it has too much exposure to the client, industry or country. This is “concentration risk’, the opposite of diversification. Alternatively, the bank is worried – it knows something that makes it worry about whether it will get its money back. The reason doesn’t matter, the bank just wants to sell the credit risk on the loan.
The bank finds someone who wants the risk. They like the company; they have little exposure to the company, industry or country; they don’t think the company will default; they are unaware of the risks. Whatever the reason, the investor is happy to take on the risk. The two parties enter into the CDS.
Das goes on to explain the main advantages of using CDS’s to sell risk. The first advantage is that it is, for all practical purposes, “insurance” without being considered “insurance” in a legal sense. This means that the various investment banks which trade in CDS’s do not have to obtain an insurance licence to trade CDS’s. The consequence of this is that the trade of CDS’s is not subject to any form of government regulation, including compliance with any mandatory disclosure rules.

Das goes on to list the other main advantages of using CDS’s to sell risk:[3]

It has many advantages: you don't have to do anything with the loan; you don't have to tell the borrower or get their consent; you don't have to exactly match the terms the loan. You can also fiddle the pricing. You keep the loan on your books. You get rid of the risk.

The CDS allows you to short credit easily, which allows you to profit from the decline in the fortunes of the company. Before the CDS, this was hard. As the CDS is a derivative contract, it is also off-balance-sheet. It can be leveraged, infinitely. It is the killer derivative.
The other significant characteristic of CDS’s is that they are traded “over-the-counter” (OTC), rather than being traded through exchanges.

OTC trading involves private and bilateral negotiation between buyers and sellers of CDS’s, with the investment bank acting as the intermediary. The investment banks charge both the buyer and seller fees for organising the swap.

How big is the CDS market?

According to the EC the CDS market is worth €10 trillion with almost 2 million active CDS contracts world wide. This is the value of the amount of credit risk covered by the CDS contracts, but not the value of the actual CDS transactions.

The actual payment flows from CDS contracts are is considerably less in terms of the fees which sellers pay to buyers for entering into a CDS, as well as the payments made by buyers to sellers in event that a borrower defaults on their loan.[4]

What has the EC alleged?


The EC has alleged that between 2006 and 2009 thirteen investment banks colluded to prevent International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc (ISDA) and Markit Group Limited (Markit) from issuing licences for data and index benchmarks to exchanges that proposed to enter the CDS market.[5]

In order to participate in the CDS market, new entrants must first obtain a licence from ISDA and Markit for data and index benchmarks.

The EC claimed that the thirteen investment banks were able to collude in directing ISDA and Markit not to issue licences to both Deutsche Borse and Chicago Mercantile Exchange through their ownership and control of those two organisations.

The thirteen investment banks which have been named in the EC investigation are:


· Merrill Lynch;


· Barclays;


· Bear Stearns (now part of JP Morgan);


· BNP Paribas;


· Citigroup;


· Credit Suisse;


· Deutsche Bank;


· Goldman Sachs;


· HSBC;


· JP Morgan;


· Morgan Stanley;


· UBS; and


· Royal Bank of Scotland.

The EC has also sent a statement of objections to ISDA and Markit.

On issuing the statement of objections, Joaquin Alumina, the Vice President of the EC Responsible for Competition Policy also released a press statement about the CDS investigation. In particular, Mr Alumina stated that:

To launch these exchange traded credit derivatives, these exchanges needed licences for data and index benchmarks. But ISDA and Markit refused to provide these licences because – according to our findings at this stage of the investigation – the banks had instructed them not to do so. In addition, several investment banks sought to shut out the exchanges in other ways, for example by coordinating amongst themselves the choice of their preferred clearing house. In the end, neither Deutsche Borse or CME managed to enter the market. [6]
Alumina went on to explain the EC's theory as to why the investment banks had decided to engage in this alleged illegal conduct:
In sum, exchange-trading of credit derivatives improves transparency and market stability. But the banks acted collectively to prevent this from happening. They delayed the emergence of exchange trading of the financial products because they feared that it would reduce their revenues. This, at least, is our preliminary conclusion. If confirmed, such behaviour would constitute a serious breach of our competition rules.[7]
In other words, the EC has alleged that the investment banks, colluded to preserve the OTC trading system for CDS’s, in order to maintain their high profit margins. These high profit margins came about because of the lack of price transparency which results from the OTC trading of CDS’s.

The EC believes that trading CDS’s on an exchange will result in much greater price transparency both in terms of the fees paid by the seller to the buyer for taking on the credit risk, as well as in terms of the fees paid by the parties to the intermediary investment banks for arranging the CDS.

The EC’s has also suggested that the investment banks conduct was motivated by a desire to prevent a significant amount of the current CDS trade (which consists of over 2 million CDS contracts) moving out of the OTC trading environment and into exchanges. If this happened, buyers and sellers would no longer have to use intermediary investment banks to arrange CDS’s, but rather could choose to purchase or sell a CDS directly through the exchanges. Such a move would have resulted in the investment banks losing a significant amount of the fees which they currently derive from the sale of CDS’s.

A related benefit of CDS’s being sold on exchanges, as suggested by the EC, is that exchanges are safer and more stable than OTC trading. This greater safety and stability would have provided both buyers and sellers with significant transaction cost benefits, as well as improving the efficiency and liquidity of the CDS market.

What happens next?

The thirteen investment banks, ISDA and Markit now have an opportunity to provide the EC with an explanation of their conduct in order to avoid the imposition of sanctions.

While it is not clear what explanations or justifications the merchant banks will seek to provide to the EC in relation to their alleged illegal conduct, one issue that they will be very mindful of, are the sanctions which the EC could impose for what appears to be a “serious breach of competition rules”. Any finding of an infringement of EU competition rules, such as Article 101 of the TFEU, could lead to the imposition of fines of up to 10% of the annual worldwide turnover of each of the thirteen investment banks.

Conclusion

The EC’s current investigation of the CDS market appears to be yet another example of very serious and blatant illegal anticompetitive conduct being engaged in by the world’s leading investment banks. In addition to this particular investigation, the EC is continuing its major investigation into allegations that many of these very same investment banks also colluded in an attempt to manipulate the LIBOR. The EC has recently announced that it is expecting to conclude its investigations into the alleged LIBOR manipulation by the beginning in 2014.

While it is difficult to predict the outcome of the EC's investigations, it would seem likely that if the EC’s CDS and LIBOR investigations are successful, the combined penalties which may be imposed by the EC against these investment banks will total many billions of dollars. What is also certain about these investigations is that no criminal charges will ever be laid by the EC against any bank or any bank officer or employee for the simple reason that the EC does not have criminal jurisdiction in relation to breaches of competition laws.

It is hoped that the announcement of the EC’s CDS statement of objections, following so soon after the announcement of the EC’s LIBOR investigation, will provide the stimulus for a renewed debate on the need for the EC to introduce criminal sanctions for breaches of competition laws. The fact that the EC cannot seek criminal sanctions for serious contraventions of competition laws is a serious shortcoming. This is becoming particularly evident as the EC pursues yet another investigation against the usual suspects, namely the world’s major investment banks, for what appears to be a serious, blatant and highly damaging contravention of competition laws.



[1] Antitrust: Commission sends statement of objections to 13 investment banks, ISDA and Markit in credit default swaps investigation at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-630_en.htm?locale=en


[2] Satyajit Das, Traders, Guns and Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives, Prentice Hall – Financial Times, 2005, p. 271.


[3] Ibid., p. 273.

[4] Antitrust: Commission sends statement of objections to 13 investment banks, ISDA and Markit in credit default swaps investigation – Frequently Asked Questions at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-632_en.htm?locale=en


[5] Footnote 1, above.

[6] Statement on CDS (credit default swaps) investigation at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-593_en.htm?locale=en


[7] Ibid.