The Untold Story: The ACCC’s role in the Waterfront Dispute - Part 3 - Prelude to the Sacking

Part 3: Prelude to the Sacking

Introduction

Prior to discussing the events of April 1998, it is necessary to provide some relevant background.

There was great deal happening on the waterfront in late 1997 and early 1998. The general feel at the time was that the Howard Government was trying to encourage the two major stevedores to take on the MUA.

Prior to the decision by Chris Corrigan to sack his entire MUA labour force in April 1998, there had been three significant events which I will discuss in some detail – the Cairns dispute, the Dubai trainees incident and the Webb Dock hand over. The combined effect of these three events was to create a strong presentiment that something major was going to happen very soon.

Cairns dispute

The first skirmish started in Cairns on 13 September 1997. This dispute involved the decision by a small shipping agent, International Purveyors, to terminate its stevedoring contract with the MUA and to use non-union labour instead. The stevedoring contract was very small in the scheme of things – namely, to load one vessel, the MV Java Sea, with supplies for Freeport in Irian Jaya or West Papua.

The MUA responded to this decision by setting up a picket line with the intention of stopping the MV Java Sea from berthing.

On seeing the media reports, the ACCC’s Waterfront Team immediately commenced an investigation of the conduct. These media reports were the first that the ACCC had heard about the dispute. After looking at the matter, we formed the view that any breach of the TPA would only occur once the MV Java Sea actually berthed and was prevented from loading supplies. We believed that this conduct would breach section 45DB of the TPA. Prior to that event, the picket would not have interfered with international trade and as such would not have constituted a breach of section 45DB.

The Waterfront Team worked extensively with the Chairman, Commissioners and General Counsel on drafting a letter to the MUA. The aim of our letter was to warn the MUA not to do what it was proposing to do – namely, to boycott the MV Java Sea when it berthed. I doubt I have ever spent as much time in my entire career in trying to finalise a simple two-page letter. However, the length of time we spent on this letter was an indication that we recognised, even at this early stage, that the MUA was not the type of organisation to whom the ACCC could make idle threats. We knew that if we were going to make any threats to the MUA about their proposed conduct our threat had to be credible.

Unbeknown to the ACCC, the MUA had decided to take an entirely different approach to this dispute than just organising a traditional domestic boycott. As explaining in detail in Helen Trinca and Anne Davies’ book Waterfront: The Battle that Changed Australia (Waterfront), the MUA had been focused on trying to reverse the decision made by International Purveyors to cease using MUA labour. The MUA sought to do this by placing pressure on International Shipholding Inc., the owner of the MV Java Sea.

Waterfront recounts how Mr Trevor Charles the local representative of the International Transport Workers Federation had been trying to contact International Shipholding Inc to convince the company to intervene in the matter. It has subsequently been reported that the MUA and ITF made it clear to International Shipholding Inc. that unless it did its best to convince the relevant parties to rehire the MUA stevedores in Cairns its entire fleet could become the target of a global boycott.

Apparently, the ship owner agreed to intervene by contacting Freeport, the ultimate customer, to convince them to reverse their agent’s decision to use non-MUA labour.

The ACCC did not know all these details. All the ACCC knew was that the owner of the MV Java had intervened in some way and that the MUA stevedoring contract had been reinstated.

It is quite embarrassing to admit that the ACCC was entirely unaware of what was happening in the background to this dispute.

In addition, we had not anticipated that the MUA would go off shore to try to influence the course of the dispute. We had expected that they would have continued their domestic boycott until the MV Java Sea arrived.

After this matter resolved on 18 September 1997 (a mere five days after it had started) the Waterfront team carefully considered what had just occurred. We realised that while we had not done anything of any significance, except spend an enormous amount of time on a two-page letter, we had learnt a number of important things, including a number of important things about the way the MUA operated.

First, it seemed to us that everybody else knew a lot more about what was happening on the waterfront than we did. It was clear to us that Peter Reith’s office knew a great deal more than the ACCC about this particular dispute. However, we were not actually able to confirm our suspicions about Peter Reith’s role, until we read about what had happened in the Waterfront book a few years later.

Second, we realised that we needed a strategy in the future to deal with any MUA conduct which occurred overseas. We needed to know whether the ACCC could take action against the MUA under the TPA for offshore conduct. We also had to work out a strategy as to how to get the evidence to prove such an “offshore” breach.

Third, time was going to be a more significant problem than we had anticipated. This entire dispute had only lasted five days. To collect evidence and launch a case in this time frame was almost impossible unless we took a radically different approach to our investigation and litigation.

Dubai trainees incident

The Dubai dispute was a very strange event. In early December 1997, stories started appearing in the Australian media that a band of former Australian soldiers were being trained in Dubai as part of a plot to take over the Australian waterfront and oust the MUA. As you can imagine, we did not believe these reports when they first appeared as the entire scenario seemed much too farfetched.

From what we could understand at the time, various parties had funded a band of former Australian soldiers to go to Dubai to receive training on the operation of stevedoring equipment. We also understood that these individuals would be returning to Australia once they had received their training to become stevedores. Everyone suspected that Corrigan would end up employing these individuals.

On becoming aware of this latest plan, the MUA immediately moved offshore. The MUA effectively sought to put pressure on the Dubai government to prevent these individuals from getting training in Dubai. It was also reported that the MUA had involved the head of the ITF, Mr David Cockcroft in its discussions with the Dubai government.

In mid-December 1997, the ACCC heard that the Dubai government had withdrawn the visas for these individuals so that they had to leave the without getting any stevedoring training.

The ACCC’s Waterfront team did not really know what to make of this entire event. One thing we did know at the time was that the MUA’s activities in Dubai did not contravene the TPA. The MUA and ITF had pressured the Dubai government to cancel these individuals’ visas so they could not receive training in Dubai. This conduct did not breach either section 45D or 45DB of the TPA.

Accordingly, the ACCC never wrote a letter to the MUA about this particular incident. However, we again learnt a number of valuable lessons from having been a passive witness to these strange events.

First, we understood that the MUA was likely to call on the ITF in any dispute. This was a significant development, as it suggested to us that the MUA might be able to protect itself from the TPA by seeking to mobilise overseas groups to act on its behalf.

Second, I remember being very impressed by way the MUA had dealt with this issue. Not only had they moved with lightening speed but they had also been able to identify and exploit the weakest spot in the strategy being employed against them. The MUA immediately saw that their best approach was to target the Dubai government and put maximum pressure on them to stay out of the dispute.

Finally, we now focused a great deal of our research on finding out more about the ITF. We discovered that the ITF was an international trade union body which represented the interests of a large number of local trade union organisations in the transport area. One of its most active members was the MUA.

The aims of the ITW were set out in its Constitution as follows:

• to promote respect for trade union and human rights worldwide

• to work for peace based on social justice and economic progress

• to help its affiliated unions defend the interests of their members

• to provide research and information services to its affiliates

• to provide general assistance to transport workers in difficulty

However, another significant activity of the ITF was to coordinate “protest messages, demonstrations and political pressure, to direct industrial action in the form of strikes, boycotts etc” in relation to local labour disputes.

After looking into the ITF organisation in more detail at a later stage we were able to establish that it had structured itself in such a way that it would be effectively immune from liability to pay penalties or damages in the event it was sued for breaching or facilitating a breach of boycott laws.

Having said this we were also able to establish that the ITF’s power was derived entirely from the power of its local union affiliates in their home countries. For example, the ITF had a great deal of power in Australia because the MUA had a great deal of power here. The only other place where it appeared that the ITF had considerable industrial power on the waterfront was on the West Coast of United States due to the industrial power of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU).

Finally, we came to the clear realisation that nobody was keeping the ACCC in the loop on developments. We were not being told anything by the Department of Workplace Relations about what was going on, nor was Chris Corrigan providing us with any information. The irony was that when we went to interview potential witnesses, they seemed to think we knew all the details of the broader “plan” and that we were a part of this “plan”.

In hindsight, it was much better that we did not know about the broader “plan”. While it was quite embarrassing to be regularly unaware of the behind-the-scenes machinations of the Government and Corrigan, the ACCC would have been placed in a very difficult position had it know about this plan. In fact, the MUA would have probably joined the ACCC in its conspiracy action against Corrigan and the Howard Government had we actually been in the loop.

Webb Dock handover

The third and final event relates to the decision by Patrick in January 1998 to lease Webb Dock No 5 in Melbourne to a new company called Producers and Consumers Stevedores (PCS). Like the Dubai fiasco, details of this plan were again leaked to the MUA and the media before the actual handover of the site had been carried out.

When details emerged about PCS, it became apparent that it had been set up by the National Farmers Federation and Don McGauchie. Also, included in its ranks were a number of the individuals who had been part of the failed Dubai training exercise.

After looking into the matter, the Waterfront team formed the view that the PCS operation appeared to be little more than a training operation. In other words, PCS was planning to train various non-MUA individuals to be stevedores. We fully expected that the MUA would be focusing on preventing these individuals from getting employment as stevedores after they have been trained. However, for the moment it appeared that the MUA intended to maintain only a watching brief.

It also seemed to us that the MUA were desperately trying not to engage in any conduct which may constitute a boycott. Even though the MUA did have a picket line at Webb Dock, it did not actually prevent the passage of individuals or vehicles onto the premises, although some buses got pretty smashed up on the occasions that they drove through the picket lines. We were satisfied that while there was the occasional stoush between the MUA and the PCS employees as vehicles went through the picket line, that generally the MUA were doing their best to avoid engaging in an illegal boycott.

Office of Employment Advocate

The final issue which is relevant to understanding subsequent events relates to the anticipated role of the Office of the Employment Advocate (OEA).

The OEA was set up by Peter Reith in 1997 to enforce the Workplace Relations Act 1997 (WRA). The OEA had jurisdiction to enforce a range of the provisions of the WRA, including the Freedom of Association provisions. These provisions made it an offence for an employer to dismiss an employee because he or she was, or was not, a member of a union.

I remember attending a talk given by Peter Reith prior to the Waterfront Dispute (we were given some free tickets). In his talk, Mr Reith made no secret of the fact that something had to change on the waterfront. He also made it abundantly clear that any attempt by the MUA to prevent such a change would most likely lead to the union having problems under the Freedom of Association provisions of the WRA. In other words, if the MUA tried to take action to prevent somebody using non-MUA union labour on the wharves, the OEA's role was to ensure that that didn't happen. Furthermore, he made it clear that the Commonwealth Government agency which would be keeping the MUA on the straight and narrow would be the OEA. I do not recall Reith referring to the ACCC once during his talk.

I came away from Reith’s talk with the distinct (and pleasing) impression that it would be the OEA, rather than the ACCC, who would be at the forefront of any action against the MUA in what seemed to be the inevitable dispute. I also got the strong impression that the ACCC was not seen by the government as the agency which was feted to take the lead role in any action against the MUA. This probably explained why the ACCC seemed to know so little about what was going on in relation to Cairns, Dubai and Webb Dock.

I was very relieved after hearing Reith’s speech. While I did not like some of the MUA’s conduct, particularly hold cleaning, I empathized with other MUA campaigns such as their campaign against flags of convenience vessels. I had also seen enough of the MUA in action to respect their skills in dealing with disputes and to acknowledge their consummate ability to play the media. While the MUA was not the largest union, it seemed to me to be the smartest and most disciplined union, with a very strong leader in John Coombs.

However, I was also not entirely convinced that the OEA, as such a new agency, would be up to the challenge of “taking on” the MUA. This is precisely what happened when the dispute broke out - the OEA immediately jumped ship, leaving the enforcement field entirely to the ACCC.

The Untold Story: The ACCC’s role in the Waterfront Dispute - Part 2 - Hold Cleaning

Part 2: Hold Cleaning

Introduction

The practice of cleaning out the holds of vessels had been around for a very long time. The practice started in Sydney’s Balmain in 1900 with the establishment of the Balmain Labourers Union whose members were engaged primarily in painting, cleaning, docking and undocking of vessels.

In 1916, the Balmain Labourers became the Federated Ship Painters and Dockers Union (Painters and Dockers).

The Painters and Dockers came to prominence in 1980 when it became the subject of the Royal Commission on the Activities of the Federated Ship Painters and Dockers Union, better known as the Costigan Royal Commission.

In the course of the Royal Commission, the Royal Commissioner Mr Frank Costigan, concluded that the Painters and Dockers union was in actual fact an organised criminal organisation.

Mr Costigan summarised the activities of the Painter and Dockers in the following way in his Report:

I became satisfied that the union, at least in Victoria, Newcastle, Queensland and South Australia (if not in Sydney as well), was an organised criminal group following criminal pursuits. At least in Victoria, those in charge of the union recruit exclusively those who have serious criminal convictions. The union gives active assistance to those criminals, be it in the selection of criminal activity, or in harbouring and protecting the criminals from the consequences of their crimes.

The criminal activities of the members of the union were not restricted to any particular sphere of crime. In my reports, I referred to crimes of violence, theft, extortion, intimidation, fraud, illegal gambling and trafficking in drugs. There was evidence of wide-scale racketeering, loan sharking and active participation in organised prostitution. I doubt whether there were any forms of criminal activity in which there was not some active participation. In this respect, the union presented no different picture to that found on the eastern seaboard of the United States of America, where longshoreman were found to be engaging in similar widespread criminality.

The Painters and Dockers were also surprisingly implicated in tax evasion – namely, the aptly named Bottom of the Harbour tax evasion schemes.

The Costigan Royal Commission was probably best known for the Goanna controversy – namely, an unsubstantiated rumour that the late Mr Kerry Packer was involved in a range of criminal activities.

Another practice which the Royal Commission highlighted in its report were the extortionate practices by the Painters and Dockers in relation to the provision of hold cleaning services to ship owners.

Historically, the Painters and Dockers had been the relevant union responsible for cleaning out the holds of a vessel whenever a ship owner required that service. Such cleaning was necessary if, for example, a bulk vessel came to Australia to discharge fertiliser and was proposing to load a different cargo. The risk was the residue from the discharged cargo would contaminate the new cargo. The level of cleaning which was required depended on what the nature of the cargoes; for example, if the second cargo was food, such as grain, the holds would have to be cleaned very thoroughly before loading that cargo.

Shipowners did not have to use the Painters and Dockers to do such work. In fact, many shipowners did not like to hire the Painter and Dockers because they claimed that they were very expensive and did not do the work properly.

To the extent that members of the Painters and Dockers Union simply approached a ship owner and offered to carry out the hold cleaning work, there was obviously no breach of the TPA.

However, the problem arose when the Painters and Dockers Union demanded the work and the vessel owner refused. In these circumstances, the Painters and Dockers would often organise a “picket line” (of sorts) of the vessel to prevent it from sailing from the port until its holds had been cleaned by members of the Painters and Dockers Union.

The way the “picket” was organised was quite novel. Usually a number of unidentified persons, most probably Painters and Dockers union members, would simply turn up at the vessel at the scheduled sailing time and sit on the bollards which held the line tying the vessel to the wharf. The linesmen (who were also members of the Painters and Dockers) would then arrive at the vessel to release the lines. However, when the linesmen arrived at the bollard, they would see the unidentified men sitting on the bollards and refuse to release the line on the basis that to do so would cause a safety issue. The linesmen claimed that if they tried to move the men sitting on the bollards, the men may be injured in some way, for example by falling off the wharf.

After the vessel had missed its scheduled time window to sail from the port, the men who had been sitting on the bollards would simply wander off, only to mysteriously reappear on the next occasion that the vessel would be scheduled to sail.

Such conduct had significant financial consequences for the shipowner and/or the charterer. The costs of delaying a bulk cargo vessel for even one day could be as much as $10,000 a day in charter fees alone. The ship owner or charterer would also incur demurrage costs and the costs of the linesmen, towboats, and pilots who had not been able to do their work due to the picket.

This conduct would continue for many days until the shipowner relented and agreed to use the Painters and Dockers for the cleaning work.

In some situations, the Painters and Dockers would demand to clean the holds and receive payment even if cleaning was not even required.

However, the most serious conduct related to cases where the Painters and Dockers either:

• demanded payment for hold cleaning in situations where the cleaning work had already been completed by another cleaning company or 

• demanded payment for hold cleaning where the vessel had left Australian waters without being cleaned at all. 

In the latter case, the Painters and Dockers would take reprisal action against the shipowner’s next vessel to Australia to punish the shipowner for not having paid the Painters and Dockers for the hold cleaning work on the earlier occasion.

The Painters and Dockers union was deregistered in 1993. It was deregistered under the Hawke union reforms because it had less than 1000 members and not because it had been found by Costigan to be a criminal organisation. Members of the Painters and Dockers joined either the MUA or the Australian Manufacturing Workers Union.

The ACCC’s Waterfront investigation team was very surprised to discover that this illegal practice, which had been exposed by the Costigan Royal Commission in 1984, was still continuing unabated in 1997 in a number of Australian ports. The practice of either forcing vessel owners to use MUA labour to carry out required or unnecessary hold cleaning work or demanding payment for hold cleaning work already carried by another cleaning company was occurring quite regularly in the bulk cargo ports in Western Australia, South Australia, Newcastle and Port Kembla.

Although some of the allegations from the Costigan Royal Commission about hold cleaning had been referred to various police agencies, including the NSW State Crime Commission, the practice had not been stamped out. What was even more surprising was that some of the particular individuals named during the Costigan Royal Commission were still engaging in the same conduct almost 20 years later.

ACCC’s investigation

The first stage in the ACCC’s investigation of the hold cleaning conduct involved trying to gain the trust of the major bulk shipping companies operating in Australia. We needed their assistance if we were going to obtain the evidence to establish the contraventions. However, the major problem which the ACCC faced was a lack of credibility.

The industry did not have a high opinion of the ACCC as an effective and fearless regulator. The industry was also sceptical that the ACCC could clean up hold cleaning when the Costigan Royal Commission itself had failed to stop the conduct. Accordingly, we spent a great deal of time and effort trying to convince the industry that we were willing and able to stamp out the practice. We did this a number of ways.

First, we sought to present ourselves to the industry as uncompromising, no nonsense investigators who were up to the task of stamping out illegal hold cleaning. This meant we talked very tough with everybody we interviewed, sometimes to the point of being quite belligerent.

By way of example, on one occasion we were interviewing a number of staff from a large European owned shipping company when the Managing Director of the company walked into the interview and started to tell us that the ACCC would never succeed in its hold cleaning case and that we were wasting his staff’s time. I immediately turned to the Managing Director, looked him straight in the eye and said in the most serious sounding voice I could muster that he was wasting our time and that it would be better if he left so we could get on with our investigation. He immediately walked out of the room looking decidedly sheepish.

Incidentally, this company continued to assist us throughout the investigation and provided the ACCC with valuable evidence which we used in our legal proceedings.

We also nonchalantly dismissed the concerns raised by industry participants that there may be a risk of violence if we sought to tackle the hold cleaning issue.

Second, we spent a great deal of time explaining to the industry the way we were proposing to approach our investigation and what outcomes we would be seeking to achieve. One advantage that we had was that section 45DB had recently been introduced into the TPA which made it much easier for us to establish a contravention of the TPA. Providing such detailed explanations to the industry was an important element in winning the industry’s trust. The industry would only trust us if they believed that we knew what we were doing and that we were confident of being successful.

Third, we had to convince the industry we were not part of some broader Howard Government plot to destroy the MUA. We quickly realised that while the industry was quite reluctant to get involved in litigation against the MUA, it was even more reluctant to get involved in the political machinations of the government.

This final issue proved to be the most difficult aspect of the investigation due to the interference of two Howard Government consultants in our investigation. Shortly after we had commenced our investigation, it came to our attention that two individuals were seeking to reinterview the same people we had been interviewing. We soon discovered that these individuals were Dr David Trebeck and Mr Stephen Webster, who had been hired as consultants to the Howard Government to investigate various strategies in relation to the MUA. These individuals had heard about our investigation and were trying to find out more.

We were very concerned that the actions of these individuals would seriously jeopardise our investigation by blurring the fact that the ACCC was an independent statutory body which was enforcing the TPA and not an organisation which was simply doing the government’s bidding.

Industry participants started to ask us whether we were working with “Dr Trebeck and his people.” We were very direct in our response to the industry stating in no uncertain terms (and in the toughest sounding way we could) that:

• we had nothing to do with “Dr Trebeck and his people”;

• we did not know what “Dr Trebeck and his people” were doing;

• we did not appreciate “Dr Trebeck and his people” interfering in our investigation; and

• “Dr Trebeck and his people” better stay well away from our investigation.

Ultimately, we were successful in gaining the trust of a large part of the industry. Based on our preliminary investigation we were able to issue a number of section 155 notices to ship owners and shipping agencies to obtain information and documents. We then started the chore of reading and analysing thousands of pages of documents about hold cleaning incidents going back over ten years to work out how many potential contraventions of the TPA we may be looking at.

Unfortunately, an unexpected and very significant event occurred which forced us to put our hold cleaning investigation on hold – namely the 1998 Waterfront Dispute.

Despite putting the hold cleaning investigation on the back burner, we were always determined to run this case once things returned to normal. However, it would be one year before we could recommence our hold cleaning investigation and two years before we were able to commence legal proceedings against the MUA for its hold cleaning activities.

The Untold Story: The ACCC’s role in the Waterfront Dispute - Part 1 - Beginnings

Part 1: Beginnings

Introduction

The Waterfront Dispute which erupted in 1998 has been the subject of a book, Waterfront: The Battle that Changed Australia by Helen Trinca and Anne Davies and a mini-series, Bastard Boys. Both the book and the mini-series dealt in considerable detail with the respective roles of the MUA, the ACTU, Patrick Stevedores and the Howard Government in the Waterfront Dispute. However, the role of another significant actor in these events has not been dealt with in any detailed manner – namely, the involvement of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC).

The ACCC played a much more active and important role in the Waterfront Dispute than most people know. The ACCC was heavily involved in the Waterfront Dispute from the very beginning. In this series of articles, I will be discussing the role of the ACCC in the Waterfront Dispute based on my own first hand experience as the ACCC officer in charge of the ACCC’s investigation and litigation on a day to day basis.

I will also be discussing some of the more misguided if not downright foolhardy ideas which the ACCC both contemplated and ended up pursuing during its waterfront investigations. For example, I will outline the foolhardy (and fortunately aborted) plan to drop a number of ACCC officers, including myself, onto the Australian Endeavour via helicopter so that the ACCC could claim that it had safeguarded the passage of the vessel into Port Botany. I will also describe the misguided plan which the ACCC ultimately did pursue – namely, to “embed” two ACCC officers behind the picket lines at Botany Bay at the very height of the dispute.

Setting up the Waterfront Investigation Team

In late 1997, it was apparent that trouble was brewing on the Australian waterfront. News stories were appearing regularly in the newspapers about alleged rorts by the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA). Peter Reith, the then Minister for Workplace Relations, was making inflammatory speeches about the union movement, with particular emphasis on the alleged rorts of the MUA. It was against this background of impending trouble on the waterfront that then CEO of the ACCC decided to establish the ACCC’s own waterfront investigation team. The CEO knew there was going to be trouble and he wanted the ACCC to be prepared.

Unfortunately, it was not very easy for the then CEO find an ACCC staff member to lead this new team. The first two candidates he asked to take on the role turned down the assignment, so the CEO was forced to look for somebody else who would be willing to do the work.

The CEO approached me and my team with a proposal that we become the new Waterfront Investigation Team. This was a surprising decision given that, at that time, my team was in fact the Sydney Mergers and Assets Sales Branch – we were not even part of the enforcement branch.

Our proposed brief was to investigate any conduct in breach of the TPA by any of the major participants on the waterfront, including the various unions, stevedores, towage companies and port authorities.

After considering the CEO’s request and discussing it with my team, we agreed to accept the assignment to head up the new ACCC Waterfront investigation team. At the initial stages, my team was not required to work on waterfront matters exclusively – rather we continued to operate as the Sydney Mergers and Asset Sales Branch whilst also conducting our waterfront investigations. Our part time waterfront investigation role ended in April 1998 when Chris Corrigan sacked his entire MUA workforce.

The main reasons why I believe the ACCC’s Sydney Mergers and Asset Sales team were well placed to head up the ACCC’s waterfront investigations was because of our particular skill set.

First, it became apparent that unions often engaged in quick, strategic and opportunistic boycotts of various businesses to achieve their goals. Accordingly, any investigation team charged with investigating such conduct would have to be able to prepare a case very rapidly. Indeed, in most instances, the ACCC would be seeking urgent interlocutory injunctions to try to stop a particular union from engaging in such conduct in the short term. The ACCC’s mergers branch had more experience than the enforcement branch in terms of being able to both conduct investigations rapidly and to prepare litigation in very short time frames. The mergers branch also had more experience than enforcement in preparing urgent interlocutory proceedings.

Second, it was likely that any illegal conduct by non-union industry players, such as the stevedoring companies, towage operators or port authorities, would raise issues under the competition provisions of the TPA. Therefore, the team tasked with investigating such conduct needed to have the skills to be able to analyse and define relevant markets and obtain market evidence.

It became apparent to the Waterfront Team almost immediately that the entire competitive structure of the waterfront had major problems. The ports, which were generally owned and operated by state governments, were in most cases natural monopolies. Add to this the fact that there were only two major stevedores (Patrick Stevedores and P&O), a monopoly supplier of towage services in most ports (Adsteam), a monopoly supplier of labour (MUA) and state sanctioned cartels for liner shipping companies (Part X of the TPA), and it was quite clear to us that the whole industry needed a complete overhaul.

Almost immediately after my team became the Waterfront Investigation Team, it was inundated with complaints about the MUA. The vast majority of these complaints were given to the ACCC by representatives of Peter Reith’s Department – the Department of Workplace Relations. Later on in our role we received complaints about other industry players, such as port corporations and the two major stevedores, which we also investigated.

The complaints we received from Workplace Relations about the MUA, related to such varied issues as:

• the MUA’s conduct in relation to off shore oil rigs;

• the MUA’s alleged actions in seeking to prevent the granting of coastal vessel permits;

• the conduct of cruise line baggage handlers, and

• concerns about the way that seaman’s engagement system operated. 

The main provisions that we had reference to in assessing these complaints were sections 45D and 45DB, which provided:

Section 45D

(1) In the circumstances specified in subsection (3) or (4), a person must not, in concert with a second person, engage in conduct:

(a) that hinders or prevents:

(i) a third person supplying goods or services to a fourth person (who is not an employer of the first person or the second person); or

(ii) a third person acquiring goods or services from a fourth person (who is not an employer of the first person or the second person); and

(b) that is engaged in for the purpose, and would have or be likely to have the effect, of causing substantial loss or damage to the business of the fourth person.

Section 45DB

(1) A person must not, in concert with another person, engage in conduct for the purpose, and having or likely to have the effect, of preventing or substantially hindering a third person (who is not an employer of the first person) from engaging in trade or commerce involving the movement of goods between Australia and places outside Australia.

Section 45D was the traditional provision used to combat secondary boycotts. This section was designed to prevent unions from engaging in sympathy strikes – ie one union taking action against a business to assist another union in an employment related dispute with that business.

We quickly discovered that section 45D was very complicated and very difficult to apply in practice. Accordingly, we decided to focus our attention on section 45DB. This provision only required two persons to act in concert for the purpose or with the effect of preventing or hindering a third person from engaging in international trade. Therefore, any act by two persons to prevent the loading or unloading of a vessel which had come from overseas or was headed overseas would constitute a breach of section 45DB, subject to the ACCC being able to prove purpose or effect.

Most of the complaints which we received from Workplace Relations did not raise any issues under the TPA. Indeed, the issues were simply industrial disputes between the MUA and their employers which involved no boycotts at all.

The ACCC also declined to pursue some of the other matters referred to it by Workplace Relations because we believed that there were strong public interest arguments in support of the MUA’s conduct. For example, the MUA had been involved in a long running campaign against “flag of convenience” vessels. The MUA would often boycott these vessels because the owners were paying their employees very low wages and requiring them to work in appalling conditions.

While the MUA’s conduct against such vessels (which usually involved picketing the vessel so that it was unable to sail until the shipowner agreed to pay their workers higher wages, including back wages) was likely to constitute a breach of section 45DB of the TPA, we were very reluctant to take enforcement action. The ACCC did not want to be effectively protecting businesses which appeared to be engaging in exploitative labour practices in relation to workers from developing countries.

Unfortunately, Workplace Relations did not take very kindly to our decision to decline to pursue a large number of their complaints.

However, amongst all the complaints received by the ACCC from various sources, there was one particular complaint which stood out from all the rest. This conduct appeared to the team to constitute not only a clear breach of the TPA but highly reprehensible conduct – namely, the practice of demanding money from ship owners for hold cleaning. Accordingly, the Waterfront Team decided to make the practice of hold cleaning the focus of its first major waterfront investigation.

Sims needs to fix ACCC Enforcement

Introduction

The ACCC’s enforcement capabilities have significantly declined over the last eight years during the reign of the previous Chairman. The new Chairman of the ACCC, Rod Sims must take urgent and decisive action to arrest this decline in enforcement standards. I doubt I am alone in my assessment of the ACCC’s enforcement area. Most practitioners who deal with the ACCC regularly are likely to share my view that the ACCC’s enforcement standards have declined.

In this article, I will be presenting a number of first hand examples which I believe are symptomatic of the significant deterioration in the ACCC’s enforcement practice over the last eight years. I will seek to identify the causes of this deterioration and then propose a number of solutions which may go some way to arresting this decline.

Background

My comments on the ACCC’s enforcement activities is based on my 15 years employment with the ACCC. During that time, I worked as a Director in a number of different areas, including enforcement. I also ran the ACCC’s Waterfront investigation and litigation teams during the 1998 Waterfront dispute and was the ACCC’s National GST Enforcement Coordinator during the GST implementation.

For the last four years, I have run my own sole practice, specialising in Competition and Consumer Law. During that time, I have had numerous interactions with the ACCC. I will be drawing on these interactions with the ACCC in this article.

Case Study 1

I was retained by a sole trader to provide him with Compliance Training pursuant to court order following ACCC legal action. From having worked at the ACCC, I understood that the ACCC almost always requires a person or company which has engaged in the illegal conduct to undertake three years of compliance training in the relevant provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA).

You can imagine my surprise when I discovered that this particular micro business had been required to undertake six years of Compliance Training – twice as much as is usually required.

When I queried my client about why he had been required to undertake six years of compliance training, he was entirely unaware that six years was twice the usual requirement.

I asked the client whether his lawyer during the court case had advised him about this issue. He said that whilst he had started the litigation against the ACCC with a lawyer, he had not been able to afford to keep paying the legal expenses. Therefore, by the time of the settlement he was unrepresented.

Was it appropriate for the ACCC to demand that an unrepresented litigant agree to six years Compliance Training rather than the usual three years?

Case Study 2

The ACCC is currently investigating one of my clients for the country of origin claims he places on goods which he is exporting to Europe. I have drawn the ACCC’s attention to the relevant provisions of the Explanatory Memorandum when the country of origin amendments were introduced into the TPA in 1998 which states:

Item 2 ensures that this extra-territorial element of the Act is not applied to the new Division, as to do so may subject Australian manufacturers to both the Trade Practices Act 1974 requirements and the labelling requirements of the country in which they are selling their goods. By explicitly excluding any extra-territorial reach, the new provision is limited to goods sold or made available for retail sale in Australia (at 17).

It is clear from the above extract that Parliament intended that Australian exporters should not be subject to Australian country of origin laws but only to the laws which apply in the country where they are exporting their products and where those products will be sold. This is a significant issue as the laws in relation to country of origin differ considerably between jurisdictions.

The complication arises from the way in which the Parliamentary drafters sought to give effect to the clear Parliamentary intention. The actual amendment to the CCA which was supposed to exempt Australian exporters from Australian country of origin laws was done incorrectly. Rather than exempting Australian exporters from these laws, the amendment actually “removed” the defences contained in Part 5-3 of the ACL for Australian exporters. Accordingly, Australian exporters are now in the remarkable situation, based on the ACCC’s interpretation, of having no statutory defences to an ACCC country of origin case.

Even thought I have pointed out the clear contradiction between the intent of Parliament as expressed in the relevant Explanatory Memorandum and the terms of section 5(1)(c) of the CCA to the ACCC, the ACCC has been unmoved.

They have claimed that that because the words of section 5(1)(c) are clear there is no need to look at the intent of Parliament as expressed in the Explanatory Memorandum.

Why is the ACCC ignoring the clear intent of Parliament in relation to Australian country of origin laws and the activities of Australian exporters?

Case Study 3

I assisted a client in a case against a large multinational corporation. Prior to my involvement, his then lawyer had written to the ACCC to seek their assistance in his matter. Given he was a very small business and his opponent was a large multinational company with annual revenues of $35 billion, it seemed sensible to try to get the ACCC to help him.

The ACCC, in their letter back to the client, said they could not assist him because:

• many of the relevant issues appear to be issues of contract between the client and the large multinational corporation. The ACCC claimed that the issues fell outside the TPA and that accordingly, the ACCC did not have jurisdiction to intervene; and 

• there was insufficient evidence to suggest that the alleged conduct by the large multinational corporation constituted unconscionable conduct within the meaning of sections 51AA or 51AB of the TPA. In reality, the alleged conduct was a very straightforward section 52 case – hardly an issue which fell outside the TPA. 

The client’s then lawyer had also made a slight error in their letter to the ACCC by referring to sections 51AA and 51AB instead of section 51AC. Section 51AC would have been the appropriate provision as the conduct involved commercial unconscionability rather than consumer unconscionability. Strangely, the ACCC did not even consider the relevance of section 51AC even though it was clearly available on the facts.

The client ended up pursuing their own private legal action against the large multinational company in the NSW Supreme Court. The client was successful in their case under section 52 of the TPA and was awarded over $1.1 million in damages.

Should the ACCC have advised this small business that they did not have jurisdiction under the TPA to consider a run of the mill misrepresentation case?

Case Study 4

I was retained by a client to provide Compliance Training. This client explained to me the various allegations raised against his company by the ACCC. One of the allegations related to a claim that he had attempted to switch products. In other words, the ACCC alleged that his company had advised a customer that they would be supplying that customer with one particular product but that they had subsequently attempted to supply that customer a different product. The client actually received section 155 notices containing this particular allegation.

However, when I looked into the allegation it was absolutely clear from even a cursory investigation that the proposed replacement product was a much superior product to the product which had been originally promised to the customer. Furthermore, the replacement product was worth approximately $40,000 more than the initial product. Even the most rudimentary ACCC investigation would have shown that there was no substance to this allegation as product switching allegations require some detriment arising from the fact that the customer has been supplied an inferior and cheaper product to the one represented.

Did the ACCC conduct even a basic investigation of this allegation prior to issuing section 155 notices to the company?

Case Study 5

The ACCC decided to settle a large number of matters involving Coles and Woolworths concerning restrictive shopping centre leases by way of section 87B undertakings. This was in circumstances where one of the companies – Woolworths - had considerable prior form for contravening the competition provisions of the CCA. Indeed, both Coles and Woolworths had been pursued by the ACCC fairly recently for entering into restrictive agreements in the NSW liquor industry and fined millions of dollars.

When queried about why the ACCC had not taken legal action against these companies, Mr Samuel responded by saying that most of the agreements were not in fact contraventions of the CCA.

This is a strange response given that even one contravention of the competition provisions of the CCA carries a maximum fine of either $10 million, 10% of the annual turnover of the contravening company or three times the gain arising from the contravention.

Should the ACCC be letting off large publicly listed companies with a mere section 87B undertaking for serious Part IV breaches in circumstances where they have contravened these same provisions in the past?

In addition, why is the ACCC ostensibly seeking section 87B undertakings for some conduct which it knows does not contravene the CCA?

Case Study 6

I was retained by a client to assist them in complying with a number of court orders. The client had been taken to court by the ACCC because he was not complying with the Franchising Code of Conduct.

After speaking to the client, it became apparent that he had previously retained a lawyer to draft his agreements on the specific condition that they not be franchise agreements. The client had specifically wanted licence agreements so that he would not have to comply with the Franchising Code of Conduct. Unfortunately, the lawyer had not drafted the agreements in the way requested by the client. The agreements he had drafted were clearly Franchise Agreements.

I asked the client whether the ACCC had been aware of these facts prior to commencing legal action against him. He said that he had told the ACCC that he had asked a lawyer to draft up licence agreements and that he had relied on this lawyer’s advice that they were in fact licence agreements. Unfortunately, this very relevant fact made no difference to the ACCC’s decision to take legal action against this small business.

However, there was some good news. I assisted this client in taking legal action for negligence against the lawyer who had failed to draft the licence agreement properly in the first place. The respondent solicitor called in LawCover almost immediately and LawCover settled the negligence claim soon afterwards.

Should the ACCC be taking legal action against small businesses who have obtained incorrect legal advice and acted on that advice in good faith?

Case Study 7

I was retained by a company which had unfortunately been the subject of two ACCC search warrants. During the course of search, ACCC staff removed two hard disks from the premises and returned them within 72 hours as required by section 154GA.

Unfortunately, the ACCC did not appear to comply with the requirements of section 154GA(2) of the TPA which requires the ACCC to:

• advise the recipient of the search warrant when they were proposing to examine or process the information on the hard disks; and 

• allow that person to attend when the hard disks were being examined or processed by the ACCC, either in person or through a legal representative. When I queried the ACCC about this apparent failure to comply with the section 154GA(2) of the CCA, they blithely responded that they had not moved the hard disks pursuant to section 154GA but rather had seized them pursuant to section 154H.

Did the ACCC really seize these hard disks or were they in fact moved pursuant to section 154GA?

Case Study 8

I acted for a client who had been the subject of legal action by the ACCC. I looked into the case as part of my task of preparing compliance training. While the client had decided to settle the ACCC’s litigation by consent, prior to settlement the ACCC had filed a draft witness list.

The ACCC was proposing to call six non-ACCC witnesses. I was surprised to see that five of the proposed witnesses were employed by current competitors of my client. Of these five witnesses, two had been former employees of the client who had been dismissed by the client for performance issues. One of these two witnesses had been the subject of an AVO by the client for allegedly making death threats against the client.

This was not a cartel case where the five competitor witnesses were giving evidence pursuant to an immunity agreement. Rather this was a run of the mill misleading and deceptive conduct case.

Should the ACCC be more cautious in their selection of potential witnesses?

Case Study 9

I acted for a client who submitted an FOI request to the ACCC. The FOI request captured 54 documents, totalling 623 pages, and 160 video recordings.

The ACCC decided to release only two of the 54 documents or approximately 0.03% of all folios requested. It also decided not to release any of the video recordings which related to the execution of two search warrants at the client’s premises.

The two documents released by the ACCC were already in the possession of the client and had not actually been requested by the client pursuant to his FOI request.

The ACCC made absolutely no effort to redact any documents, nor did they provide any statement, as required under the legislation, as to why they had not tried to redact confidential information in any of the documents.

The ACCC also provided the client with a schedule of the documents as required under the legislation. The following is a list of the deficiencies in the schedule:

• 42 of the 54 documents had no addressee recorded; 

• 4 documents had inadequate identification of the addressee; 

• in other words, 46 of the 54 documents or 85% of the documents, had no addressees recorded, or inadequate identification of the addressees; 

• 45 of the 54 documents or 81% of the documents had no date recorded; 

• 20 of the 54 documents had no description recorded; 

• 32 of the 54 documents had incomplete descriptions; 

• in other words, 52 of the 54 documents, or 96% of the documents, had no description, or an incomplete description of the documents. 

When we queried the sparseness of the information provided in the schedule, the ACCC claimed that they had invoked section 26(2) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 which states:

(2) A notice under this section is not required to contain any matter that is of such a nature that its inclusion in a document of an agency would cause that document to be an exempt document.

In other words, the ACCC invoked this exceptional provision in the FOI Act 73 times in relation to 54 documents.

Interestingly, the schedule provided to the client did not contain the word “Redacted” anywhere in the document. However, it is the ACCC’s usual practice when “Redacting” information in FOI Schedules to insert the word “Redacted” where they have redacted information.

Is the ACCC being transparent and accountable in the way it deals with inconvenient FOI requests?

Case Study 10

A client received a letter from the ACCC on 15 December 2010 asking it for detailed information about its operations. The due date for a response was 5 January 2011.

While I believed that it was appropriate for the client to ask the ACCC for an extension of time to provide a response, the client preferred to get the response submitted to the ACCC by the due date. Accordingly, we worked over the Christmas and New Year to finalise the letter. The ACCC’s investigation related to a quite complex area of law – exclusion clauses in relation to recreational services.

On 25 May 2011, or 140 days after the client had submitted their response, the client received a response from the ACCC. The ACCC had considered the client’s response and required further information. After taking 140 days to consider the client’s response the ACCC required a response from the client in nine days time.

The client again wanted to comply by the due date, so we did.

Is it appropriate for the ACCC to take an excessively long time to consider responses from a company under investigation and then demand responses from that company in very short time frames?

Summary of the problems

The above 10 case examples give some flavour of the current state of ACCC enforcement. In my view, the ACCC’s enforcement practices are currently characterised by a tendency to:

• take harsh and aggressive action against small and medium sized businesses; 

• treat some larger businesses too leniently, particularly Coles and Woolworths; 

• take excessively long times to respond to letters from companies while demanding responses from these same companies in very short time frames; 

• be oblivious to the competitive dynamics which may be motivating companies and individuals to complain or give evidence about their competitors; 

• not give appropriate weight to valid excuses or explanations from small to medium sized businesses for their illegal conduct; and 

• taking a highly legalistic and obstructionist approach to FOI requests. 

Other typical practices of ACCC enforcement in their correspondence includes:

• simply ignoring inconvenient questions - I recall many instances where I have written to the ACCC and asked them a valid but admittedly difficult question. The response from the ACCC in most cases has been to simply ignore the difficult question which I have asked; 

• providing “cute” answers to difficult questions – where the ACCC does in fact try to respond to a difficult question, it often chooses to provide a clever but ultimately elusive answer; 

• being highly defensive when responding to criticism – the ACCC does not welcome criticism despite its statements to the contrary; 

• being dismissive of complaints by not providing reasons or valid reasons for dismissing a legitimate complaint – the ACCC is failing to pursue many promising cases due to its poor complaints assessment processes; 

• misstating the law – I have often been queried by clients about particular parts of ACCC letters which they have not understood. On more than one occasion, I have had to explain to the client that the relevant section of the ACCC letter was simply an incorrect statement of the law. What are the causes of the problem?

I believe that the main causes of the problem in ACCC enforcement can be traced back to the influence of the former Chairman, Graeme Samuel.

First, the former Chairman was not a strong believer in priorities for the ACCC, with the possible exception of cartels. This resulted in staff being very unclear as to what types of matters they should be pursuing.

Second, the former Chairman was also very unpredictable which added to staff confusion as to which types of matters to pursue. Staff would often look for any signs from the former Chairman as to the types of matters which he considered to be important. These signs were often conflicting and changed from day to day.

Third, the former Chairman also placed a great deal of emphasis on getting quick results. An unintended result of this focus on quick results was to create a disincentive amongst enforcement staff to pursue longer and more complex cases, particularly: 

• franchise cases, 

• unconscionable conduct cases and 

• misuse of market power cases 

Another major cause of the problems which are besetting ACCC enforcement at the moment is the absence of any proper investigatory training for staff. When I started at the ACCC, I attended a one-week orientation / investigation training course. That was the extent of my investigatory training. The rest of the investigatory skills which I acquired was obtained from on the job training. Fortunately, I was able to work with some excellent investigators from whom I gained invaluable skills and experience.

I understand that ACCC investigators still do not receive a great deal of investigatory training, particularly in such crucial areas as conducting formal interviews and executing search warrants.

It is absolutely essential for ACCC investigators to get more and better investigatory training given that they will now be investigating criminal cartels. The investigatory skills required to obtain evidence to prove a criminal cartel are much more sophisticated than those required to prove a civil contravention. In a criminal cartel investigation, ACCC investigators will have to have the skills to:

• properly execute search warrants; 

• caution potential defendants prior to interviewing them; 

• conduct formal interviews with potential defendants rather than using section 155 powers; 

• maintain a proper chain of evidence; and 

• properly analyse recordings of telephone intercepts. 

How to fix the problems?

The first step in fixing the problems in ACCC enforcement is to set out some clear priorities. The new Chairman Rod Sims has already gone some way to addressing this problem in his first few speeches, where he has sought to clearly articulate the ACCC’s enforcement priorities.

The ACCC should also review the ACCC’s case selection processes. The processes which are currently applied are much too ad-hoc. They rely significantly on the personal preferences and workloads of individual officers and regional directors. Regional Directors should be meeting regularly to discuss their case loads to make sure they are focusing on the correct areas as identified in the ACCC priority statement.

The ACCC should also change its enforcement focus so that it commences more investigations into the conduct of larger corporations rather than the conduct of smaller businesses. The ACCC is taking formal action against too many small businesses who are first time offenders. The ACCC should also look at issuing more warnings to such small businesses rather than requiring them to enter into section 87B’s.

The ACCC needs to introduce some internal review processes to make sure that the cases it is pursuing are appropriate and being conducted properly. For example, there should be a senior person, somewhat akin to an Internal Ombudsman, within the ACCC to whom businesses can complain directly if they believe that some aspect of the investigation or litigation against them is not being carried out appropriately.

Currently, businesses can complaint to a senior manager or the CEO about such conduct. However, the complaint will invariably be referred back to the primary case officer for a response. This results in the responses to complaints being highly defensive and unfortunately, in some cases, quite evasive. The ACCC should set itself much higher standards in terms of complaints handling in relation to complaints about the ACCC. These standards should be similar to the standards that the ACCC itself sets for the companies which it has pursued for breaches of the CCA.

The ACCC must ensure that it does not take advantage of businesses who do not understand the law because they are without legal representation. I have been retained by many small businesses after they have entered into an s87B undertaking who had absolutely no understanding of what they had just agreed to. It is not adequate for the ACCC to say that such businesses should have obtained their own legal advice. Rather I believe it is incumbent on the ACCC to fully explain to these businesses what they are signing and what they are agreeing to do.

The ACCC needs to change its entire approach to responding to FOI requests. The ACCC is currently very legalistic and obstructionist in the way it responds to FOI requests. This approach is at entirely odds with current Commonwealth Government policy which is encouraging agencies to be more transparent and to release more information.

ACCC enforcement staff who are involved in investigations need to gain appropriate investigatory training. For example, in the US cartel investigations are carried out exclusively by the FBI. The FBI will be involved in interviewing potential defendants, obtaining information from members of the public about a particular cartel, chasing up investigatory leads, analysing documents provided by the defendant and giving expert evidence in court or before the grand jury. The FBI will also execute the search warrants.

An FBI agent receives 20 weeks of intensive basic training at the FBI Academy before becoming an agent. This training focuses on four core skills areas, two of which are interviewing and interrogation. FBI agents must then complete further training on a regular basis.

While I am not suggesting that ACCC investigators receive a similar level of training as FBI agents, the level of training which ACCC investigators receive has to be significantly increased and enhanced.

Finally, the ACCC enforcement area has to start using a great deal more common sense in the way it approaches its work. Unfortunately, I have found that ACCC enforcement staff often apply a decided lack of commonsense in the way they approach investigations and litigation. Generally, I have found that ACCC enforcement staff have either pursued relatively unimportant enforcement matters much too vigorously and aggressively or alternatively been much too casual and offhand in their approach to potentially significant matters.

Whilst there are examples of the ACCC getting the balance just right, these examples are unfortunately few and far between. The ACCC must be getting it right more often than not.

Conclusions

ACCC enforcement capabilities have declined considerably over the last eight years. Ironically, I have been able to discern the decline in standards much more vividly since I left the ACCC and started working as a private practitioner.

Unfortunately, I have rarely found myself in a position in the last four years of wishing to praise the ACCC’s enforcement efforts in particular cases. Rather, in almost every case in which I have been involved I have found significant mistakes, a lack of attention and a lack of commonsense. In some matters, I have found a decided lack of candour.

Sims now has an excellent opportunity to take decisive steps to try to fix the problems in ACCC enforcement. No time can be lost in implementing the necessary changes. Enforcement has always been the ACCC’s core area in terms of generating outcomes which consumers can understand and find meaningful. If the ACCC does not get enforcement right, it will rapidly lose relevance with its core constituent – the Australian consumer.

Carbon tax price gouging – understanding the pitfalls

This article first appeared in the October 2011 edition of the NSW Law Society Journal, Vol. 49, No. 9, pp. 68-71.

Introduction

On 13 July 2011, the Prime Minister, Julia Gillard and the Treasurer, Wayne Swan announced that the ACCC would be given responsibility to police how businesses pass on the carbon tax.[1] The ACCC will be responsible to ensure that businesses do not engage in price gouging by using the tax as an excuse to increase prices beyond the actual price effect of the carbon tax.

If the introduction of the GST is any guide, the carbon tax is likely to result in a great deal of investigatory activity by the ACCC.[2] The ACCC received over 35,000 GST related complaints in the first 18 months of the tax, and conducted more than 3000 formal investigations into alleged price exploitation and misleading and deceptive conduct. [3]

Practitioners need to be prepared for the introduction of the carbon tax so that they can assist their clients:

• to implement proactive strategies to minimise the risk of gaining unwanted attention from the ACCC; and 

• dealing with the ACCC, if they do become the unfortunate subject of an investigation.

ACCC’s role

The ACCC’s role will be to prevent price gouging during the introduction of the carbon tax. This role will be limited to investigating alleged misrepresentations by businesses about their pricing rather than investigating all price rises. The ACCC will not be able to investigate price rises if the business has made no mention of the carbon tax.

This contrasts to the situation during the introduction if the GST, when the ACCC was given new powers to prevent price exploitation.

In order to fulfil this new role, the ACCC has been given additional funding of $12.8 million over four years. The ACCC will use this funding to hire 20 additional staff who will be engaged in education, liaison, investigations and litigation.

What will the ACCC are looking for?

The ACCC will be looking for four main types of conduct as part of its carbon tax-policing role, both before and after the introduction of the carbon tax on 1 July 2012.

Pre-1 July 2012 conduct

The ACCC is on the lookout for businesses which may attribute price increases to the carbon tax even before the tax is introduced. As remarkable as it sounds, there has already been a report of an Australia Post employee allegedly attributing an increase in the price of posting a parcel to the carbon tax.[4]

Sections 18 and 29(1)(c) of Australian Consumer Law (ACL)[5] will be the ACCC’s primary weapons against carbon tax price gouging.

Section 18:

A person must not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive.

Section 29(1)(i):

A person must not, in trade or commerce, in connection with the supply or possible supply of goods or services or in connection with the promotion by any means of the supply or use of goods or services:

(i) make a false or misleading representation with respect to the price of goods or services…

The above sections are very broad in their scope. They capture both misleading representations and representations which are likely to be misleading. These sections apply to all businesses regardless of their size, including unincorporated sole traders.

Representations that price rises prior to the introduction of the carbon tax are due to the carbon tax are likely to be viewed very seriously by the ACCC, because of their apparent blatancy. The ACCC is likely to pursue such cases very vigorously.

The second category of cases prior to 1 July 2012 will be future representations by businesses about the likely impact of the carbon tax on their prices. Both ss.18 and 29(1)(i) apply to future representations as well as to current representations.

Under s.4(1) of the ACL if a person makes a representation with respect to a future matter without reasonable grounds the representation will be taken to be misleading. Accordingly, a business may breach the ACL if it makes a forward estimate of the likely effect of the carbon tax on their pricing without having properly worked out the pricing impacts beforehand.

The ACCC will no doubt be guided by Treasury estimates of the likely price effects of the carbon tax. Where there is a significant difference between Treasury estimates and the business’s own forward estimates, the ACCC is likely to demand all costings to determine whether the business had a reasonable basis for its future representations.

Post 1 July 2012 conduct

The third type of conduct which the ACCC will be on the lookout after 1 July 2012 is businesses which overstate the impact of the carbon tax on their pricing. For example, a contravention will arise where a company claims that its prices have increased by, say $100 due to the carbon tax when the true impact of the tax was only $50. The ACCC’s investigations of these types of matters will be fairly complex as they will require detailed information about the business’s costs.

The ACCC’s task will be further complicated if the relevant business is receiving compensation payments from the Federal Government to offset the impact of the carbon tax. Such businesses will be expected to offset their price increases by the level of any compensation received.

The final type of conduct relates to representations by businesses that a price rise is due to the carbon tax when no part of the price increase can be attributed to the carbon tax. While this is likely to involve a relatively small number of matters, it will mainly arise in relation to businesses and products which are exempt from the carbon tax. For example, the carbon tax does not apply to petrol or diesel for passenger cars or other light on-road vehicles. However, if a service station operator claimed that the price of fuel had increased due to the carbon tax, this representation will breach the ACL.

How will the ACCC do its job?

The ACCC is likely to take an aggressive approach to its role in seeking to prevent carbon tax price gouging. Not only has the Federal Government made it quite clear that it expects the ACCC to be the “tough cop on the beat”, but the ACCC knows from hindsight that the aggressive approach which it took during the GST implementation was remarkably successful.

The ACCC will be aiming to conduct a number of high profile investigations into alleged carbon tax price gouging at an early stage in its policing role.

Early on in the GST period, the ACCC was able to conduct an extremely high profile investigation into Franklins Supermarkets for price exploitation.[6] The ACCC discovered that Franklins was charging GST on a number of GST-free food and beverage products. As a result, Franklins was forced to offer a discount on the products for three weeks, conduct national corrective advertising and to carry out a number of other corrective measures.

The Franklins outcome not only raised the ACCC’s GST enforcement profile enormously but contributed greatly to achieving general deterrence. More than one business said to the ACCC after the Franklins case that they were willing to do anything to avoid a Franklins-type situation.

In conducting an investigation, the ACCC is likely to allege contraventions of both ss.18 and 29(1)(i) of the ACL. This is because s.29(1)(i) carries significant pecuniary penalties, whilst s,18 does not. Under s.29(1)(i) the maximum pecuniary penalty is $1.1 million for a corporation and $220,000 for an individual per contravention.

The ACCC will commence an investigation either by writing to a business to ask it to explain its representations or by issuing a substantiation notice. A substantiation notice requires a business to substantiate their representations, including representations about the price effect of the carbon tax . A person has 21 days to comply with a substantiation notice or face a fine.

The ACCC may also commence an investigation by issuing s.155 notices to compel the production of information and documents. However, s.155 notices are only used in more serious cases and usually not as first step in an investigation.

Finally, the ACCC could also decide to commence an investigation by executing a search warrant. This is the ACCC’s most intrusive investigatory power and one which it has shown a great reluctance to use.[7] If the ACCC wishes to take a very aggressive approach to investigating allegations of carbon tax price gouging, it may decide to use its search warrant powers extensively

Once the ACCC has commenced its investigation and has satisfied itself that the business has engaged in a breach of the ACL, it will then have to decide how to resolve the matter. In this regard, the ACCC has a wide range of options.

First, it may decide to resolve the matter administratively without a fine or court proceedings. This option is likely only in the least serious cases, such as unauthorised misrepresentations by junior employees.

Alternatively, the ACCC may also decide to issue an infringement notice to a business which it believes has misrepresented the price effect of the carbon tax. The maximum amount which can be levied under an infringement notice for one breach of the ACL is $66,000 for a listed corporation, $6600 for an unlisted company and $3300 for an individual. The recipient of the infringement notice must pay the notice within 28 days or contest the notice.

The ACCC has used its infringement notice powers quite extensively since it received the power in April 2010. The ACCC has also shown a propensity to issue multiple infringement notices to a company in relation to related contraventions. For example, the ACCC issued 27 infringement notices totalling $178,000 to Optus concerning its “max cap” advertising campaign.[8]

The ACCC may also issue a public warning about a business which it believes is misrepresenting the price effects of the carbon tax. The ACCC can issue a public warning if it believes that: 

• there has been a contravention of the ACL; 

• one or more persons has, or is likely to, suffer detriment; and 

• it is in the public interest to issue the notice. 

However, the ACCC is only likely to issue a public warning where it believes that conduct poses a serious and irreversible risk to consumers.

It is would make sense for the ACCC to use its public warning powers where it believes it has identified a blatant cases of carbon tax price gouging in order to warn consumers about the conduct.

The ACCC may seek to resolve an investigation by either obtaining an s.87B undertaking or commencing legal proceedings. Section 87B undertakings are court enforceable agreements between the ACCC and a business whereby the business agrees to carry out remedial steps, which usually include: 

• an admission that the business has breached the ACL / CCA; 

• injunctive undertakings; 

• an agreement to undertake corrective action, such as advertisements; and 

• implementation of a compliance program. 

Section 87B undertakings can include some informal mechanism for providing consumers with financial redress.

The ACCC cannot obtain pecuniary penalties, disqualification orders or non-party redress through the use of s.87B undertakings. These remedies can only be obtained by the ACCC taking legal action.

The ACCC may take legal action where it considers conduct to be blatant, where it wants to achieve general deterrence or where it wishes to obtain a pecuniary penalty, to disqualify a director or manager or obtain non-party redress. Under s.248 of the ACL the ACCC can seek an order from a Court to disqualify a person from managing a corporation if they believe the person has contravened the ACL. Non-party redress is financial compensation for consumers.

How to respond to the ACCC 

If one of your clients becomes the subject of an ACCC investigation into carbon tax price gouging, the first thing to do is to impress on your client the need to take the investigation very seriously. The ACCC is under a considerable amount of pressure to get results in its carbon tax enforcement role. Your client should not treat a letter from the ACCC about carbon tax pricing as simply a routine matter.

The other important issue to keep in mind is to be proactive during the ACCC investigation. Do not wait for the ACCC to direct your client to carry out particular remedial steps if it has breached the ACL, as the ACCC may well propose a more formal resolution, such as an s.87B undertaking.

If your client has made a mistake, it should immediately implement remedial steps to fix the problem. This may involve posting a corrective notice on its website, providing consumers with refunds or retraining front line staff. The more corrective steps your client implements of its own volition and before an ACCC demand, the more likely your client will be able to avoid the matter escalating into an in-depth investigation, s.87B undertaking or even litigation.

Prevention is better than cure

Legal practitioners should also be thinking of ways to help their clients to avoid getting a letter from the ACCC in the first place. The best way to avoid such unwanted attention is to start a conversation with your clients now about how they are preparing for the implementation of the carbon tax.

For example, legal practitioners should be asking their clients the following questions:

• Is your business going to absorb the impact of the carbon tax on its prices or is it proposing to pass the cost on to customers? 

• Has your business prepared estimates of the likely impact of the carbon tax on its prices? 

• How do these estimates compare to the estimates prepared by Treasury? 

• Does your company wish to advise customers that price increases are due to the effect of the carbon tax or do they wish to remain silent on this point? 

• Will your forward estimates of the likely impact of the carbon tax on your prices stand up to ACCC scrutiny? 

• Have all your front line staff been briefed on what to say to customers if asked about the impact of the carbon tax on their prices? 

Conclusions

While the simplest ways of avoiding unwanted attention from the ACCC in relation to carbon tax pricing issues is either to absorb the effect of the carbon tax or to make no mention of the carbon tax in relation to your price rises, these approaches are not good business. Businesses have a right to pass on the impact of the carbon tax in the form of high prices and should do so.

Accordingly, the most sensible approach for businesses is to spend the time now to calculate the likely price effect of the carbon tax on their prices and then to advise customers in clear and unambiguous terms what that price effect is.

While the introduction of the carbon tax is unlikely to have the same impact in terms of ACCC enforcement as the introduction of the GST, the potential for businesses to suffer significant reputation damage by being the subject of an ACCC investigation is still great. Businesses and their legal advisers must start preparing for the introduction of the carbon tax now, in order to minimise the chances of receiving unwanted attention in the future from the ACCC.

[1] “New funding for ACCC to crack down on misleading carbon price claims”, Media Release by Julia Gillard, dated 15 July 2011 - http://www.pm.gov.au/press-office/new-funding-accc-crack-down-misleading-carbon-price-claims
[2] Michael Terceiro was the National GST Enforcement Coordinator at the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission during the introduction of the GST - he was responsible for coordinating the ACCC’s GST enforcement and running GST investigations and litigation.
[3] “GST Compliance”, ACCC Media Release, dated 20 December 2000, http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/87603/fromItemId/378010
[4] “Man told mail price rise due to carbon tax”, Ninemsn, 6 July 2011 - http://news.ninemsn.com.au/national/8269824/man-told-mail-price-rise-due-to-carbon-tax
[5] The Australian Consumer Law is contained in Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 which has replaced the Trade Practices Act 1974 (TPA). Section 18 of the ACL is effectively the same as section 52 of the TPA, while section 29(1)(i) is section 53(1)(e) of the TPA.
[6] “Franklins to provide three week discount to consumers for GST errors”, ACCC News Release, dated 24 July 2000 - http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/87435/fromItemId/378010
[7] Since the introduction of the search warrant power in 2006 until June 2010, the ACCC had only executed six search warrants – source ACCC Annual Reports.
[8] “Optus pays for max cap advertising”, ACCC Media Release dated 18 May 2011 - http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/988219